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Space is important.1 The recent global financial crisis has vividly pointed to spatial
patterns in economies’ reactions to the global economic shocks. This paper focuses on
labor market responses and its interactions with criminal activities in a causal and spatial
framework. We study the case of Germany as evidently this country’s economy has
demonstrated resilience during the whirl of economic crisis. Our contribution is twofold:
first, we lay down a parsimonious labor market model with search frictions, criminal
opportunities, and, unlike earlier analyzes, productivity shocks which are important
in explaining empirical regularity of criminal engagement. Second, we seek empirical
support using data on the 402 German districts for 2009-2010, the years following the
global financial crisis, in a setting that allows not only crime spatial multipliers but also
inherent endogeneity of unemployment. Adverse income shocks clearly unfold a spatial
nexus between unemployment and crime rates. More specifically, we find that youth
unemployment plays a prominent role in explaining property crime, namely housing
burglary. Our results are in line with previous research: neglecting endogeneity of
unemployment understates its impact and employing the youth unemployment share
instead of rate points to distinctive effects. The analysis offers important implications
for countries that are currently undergoing fiscal consolidation and are experiencing high
unemployment rates.
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1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis has vividly pointed to spatial patterns in economies’ reactions to
the global economic shocks. Some countries, especially European, have entered fiscal consolidation
and faced employment deterioration even contemporarily, while others experienced fast recovery in
the form of a temporary increase in unemployment rates acting as spatial outliers. Even within
a country, geographical dependencies are prevalent and may refer both to positive and negative
correlations, depicting - respectively - resemblance or dissimilarity of regional economic traits. In
this paper we are interested in how spatial attributes and conditions of the labor markets become
intertwined with other socio-economic aspects such as criminal activities, by examining the role of
the geographical distribution of unemployment and crime rates at the regional level incorporating
possible spillovers among neighboring German communities.
Cook and Zarkin (1985) and even more recently Bushway, Cook, and Phillips (2012) analyze the
association between recessions and crime for the U.S. and confirm a link for property crime (burglary,
robbery and motor vehicle theft) but none for violent (homicide). Thus, contemporaneous socio-
economic developments render the study of the causal nexus between unemployment and crime rates
felicitous: provided we observe severe changes in unemployment rates, especially sharp increases
as aftermath of the global financial crisis, are we also faced with similar comovements in crime?
Understanding the nexus between labor markets and crime incidence can have immense public
policy implications on (local) government budget decisions regarding the allocation of resources in
order to minimize social and economic costs stemming from the incidence of crime. If the findings
point to this direction, then we are readily provided with an effective policy tool to combat crime,
i.e. adjusting labor market conditions as opposed to deterrence factors or penology.
For our undertaking we choose to concentrate on the social-shock absorbers in Germany as ev-
idently the country’s economy has demonstrated resilience during the whirl of economic crisis.
Germany survived the crisis with a decline in employment that was much smaller than had been
expected - coined as “Germany’s jobs miracle”. The decline itself affected mainly export-oriented
manufacturing firms,2 younger persons and males especially in Western Germany and lasted for the
year 2009, that is the year following the global financial crisis (BfA, 2009). In essence, Germany’s
case allows us to exploit a single-year deterioration of the labor market conditions in order to ex-
plore effects on various crime-rate categories in a spatial, yet conceptually simple framework. Our
contribution to the related literature can be summarized as follows: first, we intertwine theory and
empirics by laying down a labor market model and testing its theoretical predictions with data at a
more disaggregate level than that of the Federal States. Second, as the processes of unemployment
and crime unfold not only with the passage of time but also in natural space, we deploy spatial
notions in both theoretical and econometric models. Third, we manage to verify the importance
of youth unemployment as a major determinant of property crime, namely theft by burglary of
a dwelling. Fourth, and most importantly, for the first time we address not only plausible biases
stemming from the simultaneity of unemployment in a crime equation, but also misspecification
2Indeed, as Moeller (2010) argues, the specific type of German flexibility does not stem from high labor turnover
rates (hiring and firing), but through an unprecedented level of buffer capacity within firms. Avoidance of mass
firing during the 2008-2009 crisis can be ascribed to the so-called “Kurzarbeit” recession program of reduced
working hours in Germany (OECD, 2010). A more recent approach can be found in Burda and Hunt (2011). Faia,
Lechthaler, and Merkl (2013) confirm that unlike standard demand stimuli “Kurzarbeit” policies yield large fiscal
multipliers, as they stimulate job creation and employment.
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attributed to the presence of the spatially lagged dependent variable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature
and lays down a motivation of our work. Section 3 is devoted to the model outline and main
theoretical results. We conduct some data exploratory analysis in Section 4 and translate theory
into a spatial autoregressive type model. In Section 5 we present empirical findings and calculate
impacts incorporating spatial multipliers. Finally, Section 6 concludes, whereas Appendices collect
all the proofs and supporting material.
2 Literature Review and Motivation
The work of Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1973) and refinements in Block and Heineke (1975) formulated
a framework to model criminal activities from an economic theory perspective. The implications
commenced a series of studies with the aim to uncover crime-deterrence factors and the causal
relationship between economic decline - e.g. increasing income inequality or unemployment - and
crime rates. In the decades to follow various data structures such as pure time series or longitudinal
data sets and diverse statistical and econometric techniques have been deployed. Chiricos (1987)
and later on Levitt (2001) cast doubts on the appropriateness of aggregate data, e.g. time series,
as means to examine the link between unemployment and crime; national-level data ignore much of
the variation realized at more disaggregate levels. Rupp (2008) provided a comprehensive review of
the issue at hand and emphasized that results depend on the time horizon distinguishing between
short-run or long-run effects as well as subgroups of unemployed considered according to skills and
education, race and age. Overall, the relevant empirical literature remained inconclusive on the exis-
tence of a relationship between unemployment rates and criminal activity (see Gould, Weinberg, and
Mustard, 2002). Indeed, for the case of Germany Entorf and Spengler (2000) verify the existence of
an ambiguous effect with regards to unemployment but a positive effect of youth unemployment on
crime rates. Raphael and Winter-Ember (2001) provided insight from an econometric point of view
focusing on possible omitted variable bias and the direction of causation. Hence, since unemploy-
ment rates are suspected to be endogenous as offenders are stigmatized facing reduced probability of
legal employment or as companies find areas with high crime rates unattractive for business (reverse
causality), estimates based on studies failing to address the endogeneity/simultaneity problems will
be plagued with bias.
Edmark (2005) uses Swedish county panel data and exploits significant increases in unemployment
during the early nineties to identify effects on crime. Indeed, the author verifies a positive effect
for certain property type categories (burglary, car and bike theft). Öster and Agell (2007) also
focused on the case of Sweden and with a short panel on municipalities verify a positive effect of
unemployment on specific property crime categories and drug possession. The effect remains robust
only for burglary after controlling for unemployment in neighboring municipalities. Furthermore,
instrumental variables estimation based on regional employment composition as well as interaction
terms between the share of manufacturing employment with exchange rates uncovers coefficients
larger than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) counterparts. Lin (2008) in a similar fashion resorts
to Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and instrumentation of unemployment rates with interaction
terms of changes in the real exchange rate and oil prices with the percent employed and GDP in
the manufacturing industry for U.S. panel data. The author also finds that the 2SLS estimates are
larger than the respective OLS verifying the existence of bias for property crime. Fougère, Kramarz,
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and Pouget (2009) instrument unemployment with predicted industrial structure on the regional
level (département) and find a causal effect of youth unemployment on certain categories of property
crime and drug offenses for France. Buonanno and Montolio (2008) proceed differently, i.e. they
model lagged crime rates in a GMM procedure that unveils the effect youth unemployment has
on property crime for panel data on Spanish provinces. From a spatial econometrics perspective,
recently Hooghe, Vanhoutte, Hardyns, and Bircan (2011) demonstrate for Belgian municipalities
through both a spatial lag and a spatial error model the existence of a significant spillover effect for
property crime and the strong impact of unemployment rates, although they do not instrument the
latter.3
Turning to theory, Freeman, Grogger, and Sonstelie (1996) recognize the spatial concentration of
crime and model the decision between work and steal. The authors demonstrate that the number of
criminals in a neighborhood increases returns to crime initially and use this as an explanation as to
why theft might flourish in one and not another - albeit similar in every aspect - neighborhood. In
more recent advances, Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003) develop a search equilibrium framework
which incorporates the interrelations between crime, unemployment, and inequality. Though space
is not dealt with directly, the model has spatial implications. Multiple equilibria are relevant given
that otherwise similar cities or neighborhoods can end up with very different crime rates. One
of the channels for multiplicity is simply an encouragement of criminal activity if one lives in a
neighborhood with high crime rates because the relative returns to legitimate activity are low.4
Moreover, when local labor market conditions are good the incentive for crime is reduced, and this
makes it relatively easy to maintain good labor market conditions. Burdett, Lagos, and Wright
(2004) extend the model and allow for crime, unemployment and inequality, at the same time
incorporating on-the-job search. Their model also yields a multiplicity of equilibria with different
unemployment and crime rates.
In light of the literature review, our first motivation stems from the observation that for the ma-
jority of relevant studies theoretical and empirical literatures remain separate. As recently proved,
a further understanding of casual relationships between unemployment and crime across both time
and space is indispensable for policy matters (e.g., timely reaction and prevention or reduction of
adverse effects). Our contention is that theory and empirics should inform and reinforce each other,
and see our paper as a building block in that direction. Our second motivation follows the line of
Edmark (2005) and Öster and Agell (2007), meaning we exploit turbulent times - the most recent
recession - responsible for variations in order to identify the unemployment-crime nexus. What
induces a third motivation for our work is the fact that “geography matters”5 when it comes to
understanding and explaining economic processes. Most of the aforementioned studies do not model
3Obviously, the literature review leans towards papers that explicitly consider the unemployment-crime channel,
therefore omitted thorough mentioning of studies that consider work and crime, e.g. Witte and Tauchen (1994),
and wages and crime, e.g. Grogger (1998) or Machin and Meghir (2004), although the latter do not find an
association between unemployment and crime. Other strands include deterrence factors and crime, e.g. Witte
(1980), Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) or Levitt (1997), inequality and crime, e.g. Kelly (2000) or Fajnzylber,
Lederman, and Loayza (2002), education and crime, e.g. Lochner and Moretti (2004) or Machin, Marie, and Vujić
(2011, 2012), or immigration and crime, e.g. Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti (2012), or criminal networks, e.g.
Liu, Patacchini, Zenou, and Lee (2012) just to name a few.
4This example manifests in a spatial dimension but is by no means the only possible source for multiplicity. Other
sources include wage setting that affects inclination to criminal activity, congestion in law enforcement, etc. More-
over, it can be that crime is more competitive in high crime neighborhoods and this discourages pursuing illegal
actions. It nevertheless points to spatial patterns; the strength of a particular effect is an empirical question.
5Enrico Moretti, Keynote Speech, European Association for Labour Economists, Bonn, 2012.
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment Rates, 2008-2011, Germany.
the presence of spatial patterns prevalent in crime and unemployment rates, which are inherent in
regional analyzes and in principle constitute an additional statistical impediment. Anselin, Cohen,
Cook, Gorr, and Tita (2000) discuss the role of space for crime and misspecification as aftermath
of ignoring spatial dependence. Öster and Agell (2007) is one exception, but restrict the specifica-
tion to unemployment spillovers ignoring a possible spatial multiplier effect. Hooghe, Vanhoutte,
Hardyns, and Bircan (2011) is another but do not provide evidence to substantiate a more causal
interpretation of the results by instrumenting unemployment rates. In what follows we attempt to
reconcile spatial with causal frameworks both in theory and empirics.6
With reference to our second motivation, the aftermath of the global financial crisis was initially
felt in the German labor markets in autumn 2008, culminated in the beginning of 2009 with a steep
increase of the unemployment rates and stabilized thereafter (BfA, 2009). In conjunction with
Figure 2.1 and yearly information, the unemployment rate increased from 7.8% in 2008 to 8.2% in
2009 amounting to a percentage change of 5.13%. A year later, the unemployment rate was back
to pre-crisis levels, i.e. 7.7% with a percentage change of -6.10% from the previous year (2009).
Starting 2009 we have information on the unemployment rates of different demographic categories,
namely age 15-25, male, female and foreign unemployment. Although the pre-crisis rates cannot
be tracked, we observe that all categories of unemployment rates decrease after 2009, especially the
foreign and youth demographic categories which experience the sharpest declines. We encounter
the highest rates among foreigners followed by males and, finally, although female unemployment
was lower than male in 2009, by 2011 the gender differential vanishes.
In Figure 2.2 we present the temporal evolution for specific crime categories. These include
6Admittedly, Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti (2012) tested for the presence of spatial dependence in Italian regions
before choosing aspatial specifications.
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Figure 2.2: Crime Rates and Percentage Changes, 2008-2011, Germany.
violent crime such as damage to property, purely property-related crime such as theft by burglary
of a dwelling or theft in/ from motor vehicles as well as categories that may embody both, e.g. street
crime, and finally drug-related offenses.7 As obvious from Figure 2.2, damage to property, slightly
declined in 2009 and in 2010 decreased even more. For crime categories that lead to immediate
monetary gains, first, we note a substantial increase in thefts by burglary of a dwelling after 2009
(139 cases per 100,000 inhabitants and 5.30% percentage increase from 2008), which not only lingers
but further increases in 2010 (148 cases per 100,000 inhabitants and 6.47% percentage increase from
2009). Second, we observe that theft of property in/ from motor vehicles continues a diminishing
path, but with a progressively slower pace after 2008 (from -16.94% percentage change to -12.75%
in 2009 and -5.84% in 2010). Drug-related offenses and street crime rates follow the overall criminal
offenses pattern, meaning a declining path with a smaller percentage change for 2009 (-1.37% and
-3.37% respectively).
Clearly, we observe that, first, variations after the 2008 crisis are greater for specific crime cate-
gories than overall crime rates and, therefore, empirical analysis merits from separate and discrimi-
native treatment of crime categories instead of overall crime. Second, the crisis has not affected all
crimes in the same fashion, meaning direction and magnitude of change. A plausible explanation as
well as a hypothesis formulated theoretically and tested empirically is whether pecuniary motives
hide behind distinct crime categories, as some of the latter are more likely to be committed by
economically deprived individuals, whose adverse situation clearly aggravates in times of recession.
Economic variables, and especially those we treat in this paper, can be characterized not only by
their temporal evolution as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, but also by their propagation through space
7The Appendix provides thorough definitions of the crime categories used throughout this paper. We dropped bodily
injury due to the fact that the Federal Criminal Police Office reports different categories at the district level for
years 2009 and 2010.
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Figure 2.3: Spatial distribution of Unemployment Rates (%) and Crime Rates (Offenses per 100,000 Inhabitants), 2009-2010, Germany.
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that manifests in differences in local variations. Data analysis confirms our preliminary inklings. In
Figure 2.3 we map unemployment rates and rates for various criminal offenses respectively across
Germany for years 2009-2010 on the district level, which corresponds to the European Union’s NUTS
3 classification. Germany is divided into 402 districts, 295 of which are rural (Landkreise), while the
rest are the densely populated independent cities (Stadtkreise) forming the 107 urban districts with
more than 100,000 inhabitants. Darker colors on the map signify higher rates of unemployment or
crime. It is readily seen from any graph of Figure 2.3 that neighboring districts tend to have the
same color, i.e., similar occurrence of unemployment or crime rates respectively. Obviously, unem-
ployment rates are higher at the New States of Germany (Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony and Thuringia) and the western urban districts in North Rhine-Westphalia,
which is known for its industrialization and urban agglomeration. We note that geographical pat-
terns among unemployment rates calculated overall or for specific subgroups of the population such
as age 15 to 25, male, female or foreign unemployment, convey a similar picture; therefore, we omit-
ted the maps. In what follows, we seek augmenting our analysis to include different unemployment
rate categories in order to shed light on whether and to what extent overall, male, female, for-
eign and especially youth unemployment affected crime in Germany after the passage of the global
financial crisis.
With reference to the criminal offenses of Figure 2.3 the emerging geographical patterns are quite
distinct as we plot rates for the five available crime categories. Drug-related offenses do not seem
to be heavily concentrated in specific parts of Germany. Damage to property occurs at a higher
degree to the New States or the (western) urban districts just as unemployment does. Theft by
burglary of a dwelling is more frequently occurring in districts belonging to north Rhine-Westphalia,
Berlin and its surroundings or Schleswig-Holstein and the Hamburg area. Finally, theft of property
in/ from motor vehicles and street crime are recorded predominantly in northern Germany, with
higher concentrations in the north-eastern parts and north Rhine-Westphalia. For most categories/
maps we discern that the darkest colors coincide with urban districts whose polygon area is quite
small. One possible interpretation lies in the fact that criminal activity is a predominant trait of
large cities (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999), where illegal opportunities are aﬄuent. Thus, we would
expect urbanization in the form of urban versus rural districts to play a role in explaining crime in
the dawn of crisis.8 In Section 4 we formally test for spatial autocorrelation for each year separately,
i.e. 2009 and 2010.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this work is motivated by the (relatively) recent availability
of disaggregate data (Kreise) on crime in Germany released by the German Federal Criminal Police
Office. We are quoting Entorf and Spengler (2002), who wrote a decade ago that “Evidence on crime
in Europe is rare” (p.1). Fortunately, as the review above reveals studies pertaining to European
countries are no longer seldom; specifically for Germany there is a bulk of notable exceptions, first,
with data on the German Federal States such as Entorf and Spengler (2000) on socioeconomic
and demographic factors of crime, Entorf and Spengler (2008) on the effectiveness of criminal
prosecution, Entorf and Winker (2008) on the drug-crime relationship, and second, on individual
inmate data such as Entorf (2009) on the link between job prospects and expected recidivism.
Although individual data would seem more appropriate in order to elucidate the channel between
crime and labor markets (see Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers, 2010, on aggregate crime regressions),
8Unfortunately, this information is swept out by the within transformation as it doesn’t vary over time.
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still the current paper is the first one to examine crime and unemployment at a more disaggregate
level than the German Federal States, namely the 402 districts.
3 Conceptual Framework
We develop a parsimonious conceptual framework which underlies our empirical exercise. We build
on Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003), Boeri (2011) and Patacchini and Zenou (2007). An equi-
librium search model, though describes the dynamics, can be fruitfully applied for cross-sectional
analysis. The constancy of endogenous variables in steady states enables performing local compar-
ative statics exercises and drawing testable implications. Unlike earlier analyzes, we also include
productivity shocks which are important in explaining empirical regularity of criminal engagement
among young, low-educated and unemployed males (see, for example, Chapman, Kapuscinski, Chil-
vers, and Roussel, 2002). Our framework also explicitly accounts for spatial effects, allows generating
inherent endogeneity of crime and unemployment, and yields a number of empirically confirmed re-
sults. We find that youth unemployment plays a prominent role in explaining theft by burglary
of a dwelling, i.e. property crime, and moreover, that neglecting endogeneity of unemployment
understates its effect. Calculation of average direct impacts (ADI) reveals that the effect is larger
and significant for the youth unemployment share. For the rest of the crime categories, results are
inconclusive either regarding spatial dependencies or the effect of unemployment per se.
In the simplest framework where space is explicitly dealt with, we need to introduce at least two
areas i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. Each unemployed worker can look for a job in the two areas i = 1, 2 in
spite of her residence. Firms provide vacancies in each of two locations j = 1, 2. Note that for any
variable the first subscript will denote where an agent is living and the second one refers to where
an action is undertaken. For example, uij refers to the number of unemployed workers residing in
i and searching in j. We normalize total population to 1, so that the unemployment level in area i
is equal to the unemployment rate in the same area.9 Moreover,
Ei + ui + ni = Eii + Eij + uii + uij + nii + nji = 1,
where Eij denotes the number of employed workers residing in i and working in j, and nji stands
for a number of enjailed criminals from j who committed a crime in region i. Hence, population in
i includes criminals of both regions’ descent. Note that uncaught criminals may be both employed
or unemployed, the precise conditions for belonging to either of the category to be determined
below. Workers are free to search for work in both locations and commute to work if employment
is found outside their domicile. Notice a difference between job seekers Si and unemployed workers
ui, namely
Si = uii + uji and Sj = ujj + uij ,
while
ui = uii + uij and uj = ujj + uji.
9Agent can end up in one region only - either i or j - though she can compare payoffs in both regions and instan-
taneously converge to the best option. The same normalization as ours was applied by Patacchini and Zenou
(2007).
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The total labor force residing in i and working and searching in j is uij + Eij which implies that
the total labor force in region j is equal to u1j + E1j + u2j + E2j . The vacancy rate in j is defined
as a fraction of the total mass of workers: vj/ (u1j + E1j + u2j + E2j).
Consistently with much of the empirical literature estimating matching functions (Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2001), it is assumed that matching occurs at constant returns to scale. The job
finding (or the vacancy filling rate) will depend uniquely on the ratio of the number of vacancies,
vi, to the number of job seekers, Si, that is, on the degree of labor market tightness, θi ≡ vi/Si =
vi/ (uii + uji) . Denoting the aggregate matching function as mi = m (vi, Si), the unconditional
probability of a vacancy to match with an unemployed worker (the instantaneous meeting probability
for vacancies) is then
m (vi, Si)
vi
= m
(
1, Si
vi
)
= m
(
1, 1
θi
)
= q (θi) ,
with q′ (θi) < 0, q′′ (θi) > 0 and limθi→0 q (θi) =∞, whilst the probability of an unemployed worker
meeting a vacancy is p (θi) = m (vi, Si) /Si = θim (vi, Si) /vi = θiq (1/θi) .
For production to occur, a worker must be matched with a job. All newly-formed matches (i.e.,
filled jobs) generate a periodic productivity ϕ where ϕ ∈ (0, 1]. This match-specific productivity
is subject to shocks, e.g., innovations unknown at the time of match formation, occurring at a
(Poisson) frequency λ. When a shock occurs, productivity is a random draw with a fixed, known
cumulative distribution F (ϕ). These shocks are persistent: productivity remains at this level until a
new shock occurs. And when productivity falls below a threshold level, ϕ˜, endogenously determined
in this model, it is no longer profitable to continue to produce in the existing match and the job is
destroyed.
Due to the presence of search frictions, any realized job match yields a rent. Wages share this rent
between workers and firms according to a Nash bargaining rule and are instantaneously renegotiated
whenever a shock occurs. Insofar as ϕ˜, the reservation productivity threshold, is strictly smaller than
one, a nondegenerate distribution of wages is obtained at the equilibrium. The labor market flows
prevailing at the equilibrium are given by the matching of unemployed workers to vacancies (gross
job creation) and by the dissolution of matches (gross job destruction) when their productivity falls
below this threshold level. The evolution of unemployment is governed by
4ui = λF (ϕ˜) (1− ui − ni) + ρni − (θiq (θi) + pi)ui = 0, (3.1)
where the constant population has been normalized to one, so that (1− ui − ni) denotes employment
Ei, ρ is the release rate to unemployment of the enjailed criminals n. Moreover, unemployment
is diminished by those who manage to meet a vacancy with probability θiq (θi) and are caught
committing a crime with probability pi. As the above makes clear, gross flows in the labor market
occurs also when unemployment is constant. Indeed, equating (3.1) to zero and solving for the
steady state, constant unemployment level obtains
ui = λF (ϕ˜)+(ρ−λF (ϕ˜))niλF (ϕ˜)+θiq(θi)+pi . (3.2)
Moreover, the two key (endogenous) variables determining the evolution of gross flows in the labor
market are market tightness (affecting the job creation margin) and the threshold productivity level
(affecting the job destruction margin). Equation (3.2) illustrates the first simple population-counting
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relationship between unemployed and enjailed criminals ni, to be endogenized.
Both employed and unemployed workers from region i commit a crime in region j with probabil-
ities, respectively, φWij (ϕ) and φUij . Crime is understood as a property crime or, more generally, the
one that leads to an immediate financial gain, embodied by a monetary value g. This specification
allows adding the income effect on crime in a very parsimonious way. Finally, note that including a
probability of being caught instantly and sent to jail, equal to pi, will generate differential effects on
employed and unemployed agents. The expected payoff from crime in region j for an unemployed
(employed) worker from i is
KUij = gj + piJij + (1− pi)Uij
KWij (ϕ) = gj + piJij + (1− pi)Wij (ϕ) ,
(3.3)
where Jij stands for the value function of an agent from i and enjailed in j, similarly Uij and
Wij (ϕ) are value functions for unemployed agent and employed with match-specific productivity ϕ,
respectively. The decision space for engaging in criminal activity is simply
φUij =
{
1 if Uij − Jij < gjpi
0 if Uij − Jij > gjpi
and φWij (ϕ) =
{
1 if Wij (ϕ)− Jij < gjpi
0 if Wij (ϕ)− Jij > gjpi
. (3.4)
These conditions state that criminal activities are deterred once a difference in value functions
exceed the expected gain from criminal activity, gj/pi. It is reasonable to assume that the value of
enjailed Jij never exceeds that of unemployed Uij or employed Wij . Given disjointness of two or
more events happening simultaneously, we have
rUij = bj + φUij
(
KUij − Uij
)
+ θjq (θj) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij) , (3.5)
where bj is an unemployment benefit in area j and r is the rate of time preference. In words, the
flow return to being unemployed rUij equals instantaneous net income plus the expected value of
receiving either a crime or job opportunity, i.e. a transit in states from unemployed to either a
crime or work. Note that the probability of finding a job depends on the region j’s labor market
tightness. In a similar vein,
rWij (ϕ) = wij (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Wij (z)−Wij (ϕ)) dF (z)
−λF (ϕ˜) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij) + φWij (ϕ)
(
KWij (ϕ)−Wij (ϕ)
)
,
(3.6)
which demonstrates that the value of employment in a job-worker match with current productivity
ϕ is equal to the current wage wij (ϕ) plus the expected capital gain on the employment relationship
and crime opportunity. Finally, the enjailed is described by the following Bellman’s equation,
rJij = zj + ρ (Uij − Jij) , (3.7)
where z is the consumption of the enjailed workers and ρ is the rate of release into unemployment.
There exists a partitioning of wage rates which determines the equilibrium outcomes:
1. Employed worker: accept any outside offer above her current wage;
2. Unemployed worker: accept any wage wij (ϕ) ≥ Rij , where Rij is the reservation wage defined
by Wij
(
w−1ij (Rij)
)
= Uij .
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The partitioning leads to a result which links criminal activities to earnings:
Lemma 3.1. Workers are less likely to commit crimes when their wage incomes are higher; unem-
ployed agents engage in criminal activities if and only if the workers employed at the reservation
wage R do.
Proof. The result trivially follows from the above environment (also see Burdett, Lagos, and Wright,
2003). Note that (3.3) implies KWij (ϕ) − Wij (ϕ) = gj + pi (Jij −Wij (ϕ)) which is decreasing
in wij (ϕ) as can be traced from (3.6)-(3.7): hence, the first statement. Further, KUij − Uij =
KWij
(
w−1ij (Rij)
)
−Wij
(
w−1ij (Rij)
)
= gj + pi
(
Jij −Wij
(
w−1ij (Rij)
))
= gj + pi (Jij − Uij) since by
definition Wij
(
w−1ij (Rij)
)
= Uij .
This result immediately leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 3.2. Given φUij = 0, then φWij (ϕ) = 0 for all wage incomes wij (ϕ). In words, if
unemployed in i has no incentives to commit a crime in j, then employed does not have such
incentives either for any given wage.
Given φUij = 1, then φWij (ϕ) = 1 for wages wij (ϕ) < C and φWij (ϕ) = 0 for wages wij (ϕ) ≥ C
where C stands for the crime wage, constrained so that C > R, and defined as a solution to
KWij
(
w−1ij (C)
)
= Wij
(
w−1ij (C)
)
. In words, even if unemployed commits a crime, it is sufficient
for employed to engage in criminal activities only if her wage is lower than the crime wage. Yet, if
the wage she earns is larger than C, the expected losses from a crime are larger than the expected
gains. This follows from the fact that equation (3.3) implies that the stolen amount equals the
expected cost of a crime, gj = pi
(
Wij
(
w−1ij (C)
)
− Jij
)
.
To finalize the description of the proposed framework, we need to establish the cutoffs in the wage
space. First, we equate (3.5) to (3.6) to obtain
wij (ϕ˜) = bj + λβ
[´ ϕc
ϕ˜
(1−F (z))dz
r+λ(1−F (z))+λF (ϕ˜)+pi +
´ 1
ϕc
(1−F (z))dz
r+λ(1−F (z))+λF (ϕ˜)
]
, (3.8)
where ϕcij = w−1ij (C) and β measures the relative bargaining strength of workers vis-a-vis employers
(see Appendix).
We used the result from equation (3.3): by definition, the cutoff productivity is such that
Wij (ϕ˜) = Uij . Thus, KWij (ϕ˜) = gj + piJij + (1− pi)Uij = KUij . In words, the threshold match
productivity equates value from employment and unemployment and thus leads to the same payoffs
from crime. Moreover, φUij = φWij (ϕ˜) since Wij (ϕ˜) = Uij and decision rules coincide (see equation
(3.4)). Notice that the reservation wage is productivity-dependent: the higher the productivity of
a match, the higher the reservation wage.
To obtain the crime wage, we need to equate (3.3) to (3.6). If we employ the assumption that
λF (ϕ˜) = ρ,10 this leads to
wij (ϕc) = (λF (ϕ˜) + r) gjpi + zj + λβ
´ 1
ϕc
(1−F (z))dz
r+λ(1−F (z))+λF (ϕ˜) , (3.9)
where by definition, KWij (ϕc) = Wij (ϕc) = (gj + piJij) /pi and equation (3.3) yields a difference in
payoffs of a crime and unemployment, gj + pi (Jij − Uij) = KUij − Uij . Agents forgo crime when
10Though an assumption of equal probabilities of going to unemployment both from a job and from a jail is ad hoc,
it helps eliciting the channels which interest us.
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wij = C, and φWij (ϕc) = 0. As before, productivity heterogeneity is reflected in the last term which
requires higher crime wage for more productive matches.11
Remark. As mentioned earlier, we assume, as in Burdett, Lagos, and Wright (2003), that unem-
ployed generates no lower value than criminals, Uij ≥ Jij , as otherwise unemployed would volunteer
for jail. This leads to the conclusion that there is no crime in such an environment if monetary gain
is absent: in that case, φUij = φWij (ϕ) = 0 as it is never worthwhile to engage in crime. Note that
KWij (ϕc) = Wij (ϕc) = Jij .
Notice that this assumption is compatible with previous analysis. The monetary gain gj creates a
wedge between value functions: it is possible to have 0 ≤ Uij − Jij < gjpi and 0 ≤Wij (ϕ)− Jij <
gj
pi
for gj > 0. Obviously, the larger the monetary gain, the easier it is to satisfy these conditions and
the higher crime rate is to be observed.
Since our empirical analysis concerns cross-sections, we will not cover transitional dynamics and
consider steady states only. We will partition the entire population into four segments: employees
ELji with a wage wij (ϕ) < Cij , employees EHji with a wage wij (ϕ) ≥ Cij , unemployed u and enjailed
criminals n.12
Following our previous analysis of decision partitioning and letting φUij = 1, we obtain the steady-
state values of the following measures:
ui =
ρλF (ϕ˜i)(θiq(θi)(1−F(ϕCij))+λF (ϕ˜)+pi)
Ωi ,
ELji =
ρλF (ϕ˜i)θiq(θi)F(ϕCij)
Ωi ,
EHji =
ρ(1−F(ϕCij))θiq(θi)(θiq(θi)+λF (ϕ˜)+pi)
Ωi ,
ni = λF (ϕ˜i)pi(θiq(θi)+λF (ϕ˜)+pi)Ωi ,
(3.11)
where Ωi consists of model’s parameters (see Appendix 6 for detailed expressions). The crime
rate calculated over the population which has not committed a crime is given by
ci =
ELji+ui
1−ni
= ρλF (ϕ˜i)
θiq(θi)(1−F(ϕCij))+λF (ϕ˜)
.
(3.12)
These expressions elucidate the relationship between crime and unemployment and lead to a cross-
sectional proposition which underlies our empirical inquiry:
11We do not concentrate on bargaining or producer’s side. Yet, it is shown in the Appendix 6 that the match-specific
wage obeys the Nash bargaining rule
wj (ϕ) = βϕ+
(r + ρ)βcjθj + (1− β) bj + (1− β)
(
gj + pir+ρzj
)
r + ρ+ pi , (3.10)
where 0 ≤ β < 1 measures the relative bargaining strength of workers vis-a-vis employers. This wage corresponds
to the situation when unemployed commit a crime and employed do not (“honest equilibrium” with no crime for
earners with wij ≥ C). Equation (3.10) shows that wages are increasing in match specific productivity ϕ, match
frictions cj and market tightness θj at a rate which is increasing in the bargaining power of workers. Moreover,
it also demonstrates a dependence on unemployment benefits bj , financial gain from a crime, gj , a probability of
being caught and sent to a jail, pi, the consumption of the enjailed workers zj and ρ which is the rate of release into
unemployment. The more powerful are workers, the more they appropriate of the match surplus. It is bargaining
power and frictions that allow workers to obtain a markup over their reservation wage.
12Equivalently, we could work with the match-specific productivities as wages and productivities are isomorphic to
each other. Notably, the larger the match-specific productivity is, the larger the wage. See equation (3.10) and
Appendix 6 for derivations.
13
Proposition 3.3. Regional unemployment and crime depend on average productivity in the region,
labor market tightness, crime wage and exogenous variables (probability of catching a criminal, the
rate of release into unemployment, and a match-specific shock). Then the following hold:
1. An increase in a frequency of match-specific shocks tends to increase the crime rate;
2. An increase in the cutoff productivity ϕ˜i increases the crime rate;
3. An increase in job seekers in the other region increases the crime rate if the elasticity of the
instantaneous meeting probability for vacancies is larger than one in absolute value and there
is no effect on cutoff productivities of matches and the crime wage;
4. The crime rate increases if the productivity of matches of the job seekers from i in region j
increases. Hence, an influx of more productive employees from i to j who raise the productivity
of a match in j leads to an increase in crime in j if criminals are more sensitive to changes
in match-specific productivity than wage-earners whose earnings are above a crime wage.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
We just note that part 1 refers to the increase in a frequency of match-specific shocks which can be
interpreted as an increase in a volatility of economic environment. Hence, an increase in uncertainty
because of, for instance, trade shock during a global crisis should lead to an increase in crime rate.13
Part 2 states the fact that an increase in a cutoff wage decreases a number of firms which afford
paying such a wage, increases unemployment and this how it increases a number of criminals.
Finally, an increase in job seekers in the other region increases the crime rate given the elasticity of
the labor market tightness is larger than one in absolute value. The rationale for part 3 is such that
the more there are the job seekers from the other region, the smaller is the labor market tightness,
ceteris paribus. Then, for the crime rate to increase, we require a more than proportional drop in
the instantaneous meeting probability for vacancies than there is an increase in new job seekers.
Intuitively, part 4 tells that more productive job seekers, ceteris paribus, induce an increase in the
reservation wage (productivity). This leads to an increase in unemployment and the crime rate.
This effect dominates since fewer home agents can take up job positions (higher competition from
other region) and higher wages are paid to foreign rather than home agent which reduces the outside
option and increases crime domestically. More precisely, we can employ the following corollary:
Corollary 3.4. The positive effect of threshold on crime productivity holds if and only if ∂ϕ
C
i
∂ϕ˜i
>
− r(ϕ˜i)
λ(ϕCij)
where λ
(
ϕCij
)
≡ f
(
ϕCij
)
/
(
1− F
(
ϕCij
))
is the hazard function and r (ϕ˜i) ≡ f (ϕ˜i) /F (ϕ˜i)
is the reverse hazard function. Using the wage expressions stemming from agent’s choice and pro-
duction side, and ruling out complex solutions, we can confirm that the effect is always non-negative.
Proof. See discussion in Appendix 6.
As is clear, spatial competition manifests through labor market tightness in a domestic market in
our partial equilibrium setting. We do not model full feedback effects among counties, yet allow for
changes in job seekers through, among others, influx of migrants to cause changes in threshold and
13Trade or income shock is analyzed cross-sectionally in our empirical part, i.e., the same shock affects districts in a
different way. A dynamic aspect of criminal activities where business cycles affect crime differentially across time
is analyzed by Bushway, Cook, and Phillips (2012).
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crime wages. These, in turn, shape steady states of crime and unemployment. This partial account
points to spatial competition: adjustments in the domestic labor market depends on the elasticity
of labor market tightness whereas productivity of incomers affect the equilibrium in home market
through reservation and crime wages.
4 Econometric Model and Data
Having provided insight into the theoretical nexus of the propensity to engage in criminal activities
and unemployment in a spatial framework, we now seek to operationalize the crime rate equation
given in (3.12) and find empirical support of its implications as described in the previous section
and the cross-sectional Proposition 3.3. Our empirical exercise is designed to fit the aftermath of
the global financial crisis in Germany, which affected mainly export-oriented manufacturing firms,
younger persons and males especially in Western Germany (BfA, 2009). First, we need to accom-
modate the theoretical notion that agents reside in one region but act in another, where the set
of actions/ decisions consists of unemployed or low-wage employed agents committing a crime and
employed agents working in a region other than their domicile.14 For this purpose we will employ an
econometric model that incorporates cross-sectional dependencies. Our short time span, i.e. 2 years,
excludes the possibility of testing for weak against strong cross-sectional dependence as in Pesaran
(2012). Therefore, we assume weak dependence and proceed by translating our spatial theory into a
spatial autoregressive type model. Moreover, since the steady states of the key variables, i.e. crime
and unemployment rates, are generated by a common mechanism in equations (3.11) and (3.12), it
is our contention that optimally one should model a spatial simultaneous equation system to jointly
explain crime and unemployment rates in the fashion of Kelejian and Prucha (2004) and exploit
foreseeable efficiency gains. Since parameters on paramount aspects of the unemployment process
cannot be estimated due to data considerations (e.g. vacancy rates or unemployment benefits)
at the district level (Kreise), we focus on estimating determinants of crime. The single equation
econometric model should treat the unemployment rate and its spatial effect as endogenous; for
the former we expect a positive effect on crime as seen from equation (3.12) and for the latter the
effect on crime will depend on the elasticity of the labor market tightness as stated in part 3 of
Proposition 3.3.
Second, regarding measurement for our key endogenous variables, we note that the crime rate was
calculated over the population which has not committed a crime. Lack of data on the district-level
regarding the number of (released) prisoners prohibits the usage of such definitions. In what follows
we will utilize the German Federal Criminal Police Office’s calculation for offenses rates. In district
i:
ORi ≡ number of offenses reported to the policenumber of inhabitants × 100, 000.
The German Federal Criminal Police Office uses the district population in the beginning of the year
as a denominator to calculate the offenses rate ORi, e.g. the number of offenses reported to the
police for 2009 are divided by the number of inhabitants in 2008. We have re-calculated offenses
rates with the population at the end of the year, as the latter is used by the German Regional
14More specifically, ci = cii + cji reveals that crime in region i stems from criminals who live in region i or j, and
ui = uii + uij that the unemployed in region i live in region i but search work in region i or j.
15
Database. Obviously, standard measurement issues apply, since the number of known to the police
cases may not coincide with the true number of committed crimes. To partially address this we
work with the log of crime rates, ln (ORi) (see Bianchi, Buonanno, and Pinotti, 2012). The extent
of measurement error will also depend on the crime category, since, for instance, murder or breaking
and entering are more likely to be reported to the police than theft of a mobile phone from a motor
vehicle. Regarding unemployment, we will deploy two different definitions of unemployment for the
young, i.e. unemployment rate calculated over the labor force and unemployment share calculated
over the total subpopulation. This distinction has been attested empirically when examining the
effect of youth unemployment, since rates and shares do not treat evenly a ceteris paribus increase in
students (see Öster and Agell, 2007, and Fougère, Kramarz, and Pouget, 2009). As far as sources are
concerned, we extracted district offenses rates from the 2009-2010 yearly publications of the German
Federal Criminal Police Office15 and unemployment rates from the German Regional Database.16
Herein, we focus our analysis on the 2009-2010 period, i.e. the years following the global financial
crisis, because it can be perceived as the period that Germany experienced a productivity shock
and the economic environment was more volatile. Proposition 3.3 predicts that the crime rate will
increase either through part 1 or through an increase in unemployment as in part 2.
Next, we need to translate other parameters underlying the theoretical setup into an estimable
relationship. The probability of catching a criminal (pi) serves as the deterrence factor in an individ-
ual’s decision to commit crime and constitutes on its own a subject of interest in criminometrics.17
Police expenditures, the number of policemen, the probability of arrest/ conviction/ imprisonment,
the severity of punishment as well as the average sentence length are common options for the crime
empiricist. In our case, we will proxy deterrence with clearance rates from the German Federal
Criminal Police Office, defined as the percent of solved cases in the number of reported or known to
the police cases. For the deterrence hypothesis to be verified we require clearance rates to impact
crime rates negatively. Relevant literature, nevertheless, documents that the influence of clearance
rates on crime rates can also work in the opposite direction, because policy makers may respond
to rising crime rates in ways that affect clearance rates (see Entorf and Spengler, 2000). Lack of
a natural instrument prohibits us from adopting a more causal approach in this perspective. One
strategy towards circumventing simultaneity is the inclusion of (spatial) time lags.
Crime wage (Cij) or expected gains from committing a crime (gj) and wages (wij(·)) represent
illegal and legal income opportunities, respectively. As the former are unobserved and the latter are
unavailable for our time span, we proxy (il)legal income opportunities with the log of per worker
income in the region. Per capita measures have also been proposed in the relevant literature, but we
find that the per worker proxy is more appropriate for measuring wages.18 Accordingly, we expect
a positive effect on crime if this measure captures crime wage and a negative effect if it represents
income from legal opportunities and especially employment. At this point it seems apposite to repeat
that crime is perceived herein as the one that offers monetary returns. We therefore anticipate our
15http://www.bka.de/nn_233820/DE/Publikationen/PolizeilicheKriminalstatistik/AeltereAusgaben/PksJahrbuecher/
pksJahrbuecher__node.html?__nnn=true
16https://www.regionalstatistik.de
17Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) use county level U.S. panel data and explore the role of various deterrence factors on
crime rates. Levitt (1997) studies the causal impact of police on crime for 59 U.S. city panel data. More recently,
see Durlauf, Fu, and Navarro (2012) for deterrence effects under model uncertainty.
18We note that adopting per capita or per worker measures does not affect main conclusions. We have also estimated
specifications with deviations from the national mean as relative income indicator (see Entorf and Spengler, 2000).
Results are available upon request.
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model to explain pecuniary criminal motives alone. Nonetheless and for the sake of completion, we
will provide empirical evidence on all available crime categories in order to test our assumption.
Average productivity in the district
(´ 1
ϕ˜ zdF (z)
)
is one of the main channels that connects crime
and unemployment. Productivity heterogeneity will be accommodated by the inclusion of key de-
mographic variables, such as the proportion of young males at the age of 15-25 in the population.
Including the proportion of males among the youth is driven by the empirical regularity that de-
scribes young males as more prone to crime than respective females. Furthermore, as discussed in
Section 2, urbanization is a part of demographics that plays a well-documented role. Important
information on whether the district is urban or rural is swept out by the within transformation;
therefore, we adopt a time-varying measure, i.e. population density defined as population in the
district per square kilometer.19
Equation (3.12) dictates that apart from the unemployed, it is the low-productivity/ wage parti-
tion
(
ELji
)
living in district j and working in district i who decide to commit crime, since the legal
wage is smaller than the crime wage. Although EL can be proxied by the proportion of unskilled
labor in the district, we abstain from its inclusion, first, because we choose to place emphasis upon
the unemployment of the labor markets, and second, because the steady states of the theoretical
setting imply treating unskilled labor as endogenous.20 Instead, in order to fit the profile of those
who experienced the unemployment shock during the 2009 crisis according to the German Federal
Employment Service, we model the proportion of graduates without secondary education qualifica-
tion and with general higher education entrance qualification. The proportion of dropouts reflects
the fraction of the young population that is low-skilled because of leaving school early on, while
the proportion of those qualified to enter higher education reflects those keen to invest in human
capital.
The theoretical setup requires us to accommodate interregional migration, whose presence affects
endogenous variables through labor market tightness. In our model a foreigner is defined as an
agent who acts in the home region but resides elsewhere. Therefore, we are not strictly interested
in foreigners with non-German passports per se, but in regional migrants regardless of their country
of origin. Employing the proportion of the net influx of migrants in the district (arrivals minus
departures), which might also embody foreigners in the conventional sense, may be problematic
since this measure might be affected by crime rates in the district. To avoid reverse causality issues
we will deploy information on the proportion of foreigners. Our theory, and more specifically part
4 of Proposition 3.3, predicts that an influx of more productive employees will increase crime in the
home region. Unfortunately, none of the two measures, namely interregional migration or proportion
of foreigners, provides information on incomers’ productivity. Nevertheless, the foreign proportion
measure, first, comprises a more convincing fit to the influx of EU workers in Germany starting 2010,
especially from EU countries faced with sovereign debt crisis, and, second, can be considered more
impervious to changes in crime rates.21 Finally, we note that all of the aforementioned variables
were obtained from the German Regional Database.
19Employment or labor force density is perhaps more in concordance with our attempt to connect crime and labor
market outcomes. Inclusion of the various measures does not affect main conclusions. Results are available upon
request.
20Corman, Dave, and Reichman (2013) is an example that sheds light on the female employment - property crime
channel.
21Results with the net influx of interregional migrants are available upon request. We note that the inclusion of one
or the other measure does not affect main conclusions on the effect of youth unemployment on crime rates.
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Since our theoretical design refers to cross-sectional analysis, we model dynamics over space but
not time with a short panel for years 2009 and 2010 instead of a single cross-section in order to
address possible omitted variable bias attributable to district specific unobserved factors.22 Another
issue pertains to which spatial components to include. Fingleton and Le Gallo (2008), Drukker,
Prucha, and Raciborski (2011) and Drukker, Egger, and Prucha (2013) discuss spatial autoregressive
models with spatial autoregressive errors and additional endogenous variables, whereas Liu and Lee
(2013) focus on a model without autoregressive disturbances and additional endogenous variables.
We are inclined to advocate the Spatial Durbin model, first, because the spatial lag of the dependent
variable can generate a multiplier effect, so that the econometric setup follows as the equilibrium
solution of a reaction function that includes the decision variable of other agents in the determination
of the decision variable of an agent (see Manski, 2000, and Brueckner, 2003), and, second, the spatial
lags of the explanatory variables ensure mitigation of biases for both the spatial-endogenous and
own-exogenous parameters.
The static spatial Durbin model with additional endogenous variables can be written as:
Ynt = λWnYnt + Zntδ1 +WnZntδ2 +Xntβ1 +WnXntβ2 + αn + θtιn + εnt, t = 1, 2, ..., T (4.1)
where Ynt = (y1t, y2t, ..., ynt)′ is the n × 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, i.e.
crime rates on n = 402 districts and T = 2, with λ denoting the spatial autoregressive coefficient
andWn the nonstochastic and constant-over-time n×n spatial weights matrix that generates spatial
dependence in the cross-sectional dimension. Znt andWnZnt denote the n×p matrices of additional
endogenous covariates and their spatial effect respectively, with the corresponding p× 1 parameter
vectors δ1 and δ2, which in our case reduce to the n×1 vector of unemployment rates and its spatial
effect with scalar coefficients. Xnt is the n× k matrix of observations on time-varying explanatory
variables and their spatial effect WnXnt with respective k × 1 vector coefficients β1 and β2. The
n× 1 vector of error terms, εnt, is typically assumed to be i.i.d. across i and t with mean zero and
variance σ2ε . Notice that we allow for fixed effects at the district level, denoted by the n× 1 vector
αn as well as a time fixed effect, θt (ιn denotes the n× 1 vector of ones, as usual). Due to the small
time span, time fixed effects can be captured by the inclusion of time dummies whose parameters
will be estimated along with λ, δ1, δ2, β1 and β2.
The spatial autoregressive model in equation (4.1) is characterized by inherent endogeneity: the
spatial lag of the crime rates, WnYnt, by construction and unemployment rates, Znt, as well as their
spatial lag, WnZnt, by formulation of the theoretical setup.23 Due to the additional endogenous
variable we will proceed with method-of-moments estimation instead of maximum likelihood. To
achieve identification, Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) or Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
procedures require at least three valid instruments - the same as the number of endogenous variables.
Drukker, Egger, and Prucha (2013) allow some of the vectors of Xnt to be spatial lags of the
exogenous variables and use their higher order spatial lags along with other valid instruments for
22Alternatively, one may use a single cross-section of data, i.e. focus on the year of the crisis 2009, and allow for fixed
effects at the Federal State level. This approach possibly addresses unobserved factors regarding crime, since - for
instance - important determinants of crime such as police expenditures are determined at the Federal State level,
but not unemployment aspects.
23One can trivially show that E(WnYntε
′
nt) = σ2Wn(In − λWn)−1 6= 0. Also, if E(Zntε
′
nt) 6= 0, then one can show
that E(WnZntε
′
nt) 6= 0.
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the additional endogenous variables as the set of excluded instruments. Liu and Lee (2013) further
assume the presence of many valid instruments, the number of which grows with the sample size,
and propose a bias-correction procedure for the 2SLS estimator. Our number of instruments does
not increase with the sample size, but with the number of explanatory variables; for instance, k
regressors translates into at least k excluded instruments, so that using higher order spatial lags as
excluded instruments may induce bias to the 2SLS estimator, the severeness of which will depend on
the order of the spatial lags - the first order being the neighbors,WnXnt, the second the neighbors of
the neighbors,W 2nXnt, and so on. We suspect that the higher is the order of the spatial lags, the less
will their explanatory power and relevance in the first stages be, so that we might be confronted with
a weak-instruments problem. Estimation with three endogenous variables can be quite demanding
in terms of identification; therefore, initially we focus on a spatial lag model, meaning δ2 = β2 = 0
in equation (4.1), which reduces the number of endogenous variables to two, i.e. WnYnt and Znt:
Ynt = λWnYnt + Zntδ1 +Xntβ1 + αn + θtιn + εnt, t = 1, 2, ..., T (4.2)
If the spatial lags do not have a direct effect on Ynt, then WnXnt qualifies as a matrix of valid
excluded instruments. Nevertheless, since the data generating process is unknown, we avoid using
higher spatial orders of the exogenous variables as instruments and resort to additional excluded
instruments stemming from the labor demand side to achieve identification (see below). Then, we
can include WnZnt and WnXnt as explanatory variables and compare results between the spatial
lag and spatial Durbin models. We follow Drukker, Egger, and Prucha (2013) and estimate the
model with a two-step GMM procedure allowing for arbitrary heteroscedasticity.24 The within
transformation matrix that will sweep out the district fixed effects is JT = IT − 1T ιT ι
′
T . Because
the weights matrix, Wn, does not vary over time, the within-transformed model keeps its spatial
autoregressive interpretation (see Lee and Yu, 2010). Multiplying equation (4.1) with JT yields the
estimable model:
Y˜nt = λWnY˜nt + Z˜ntδ1 +WnZ˜ntδ2 + X˜ntβ1 +WnX˜ntβ2 + θ˜ntιn + ε˜nt, t = 1, 2, ..., T (4.3)
where Y˜nt = Ynt − Y nT for t = 1, 2 with Y nt = 1T
∑T
t=1 Ynt etc.
Before proceeding with statistical exploration of the variables we describe the excluded instru-
ments. The idea comes initially from Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992) and was later
on adapted by Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) as well as Fougère, Kramarz, and Pouget
(2009).
“The instrument is obtained by constructing for each district i the growth of employment in group
g that would have occurred given the sectoral group composition of employment in the district had
each group grown at the national growth rate.”
Denote the change in group g’s share of employment between date 0 and t in district i as:
242SLS with clustered standard errors, where the district constitutes a cluster, is a commonly used alternative option
with panel data in this setting. We have a preference for GMM due to its expected efficiency gains. Moreover,
deployment of a spatial autoregressive type model already acknowledges that observations are not independent,
but clustered at the neighborhood, and captures this dependence with the spatial weights matrix. Consequently,
further clustering at the unobservable part seems redundant.
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fgit − fgi0.
We then replace the actual end of period fgit with its prediction using national measures and initial
district level shares:
fˆgit = fgi0
fgt
fg0
which implies that the change in group g’s share between time 0 and t is the difference between the
prediction and the initial district level share:
fˆgit − fgi0 = fgi0 fgt
fg0
− fgi0
or
∆fˆgit0 = fgi0
(
fgt
fg0
− 1
)
where (fgt/fg0 − 1) denotes the national growth in group g’s share of employment between time 0
and t. The definition per se of the constructed instruments guarantees their validity as each district
i - 402 of them - is considered too small to affect national trends.25
The German Regional Database provides information on the district level regarding employees
subject to social security contributions according to age and scope of employment. We constructed
instruments following the aforementioned procedure on the predicted change in the share of em-
ployment for agents below 20 years of age and between 20 and 25 years old as well as for agents
with full-time or part-time employment contract. As shown below, these are relevant in explaining
German labor markets during the global financial crisis, which affected young males and culminated
quickly due to the part-time employment contracts (“Kurzarbeit” policies). In carrying out our em-
pirical exercise we have also concluded that spatial lags of the constructed instruments - especially
the first order - can serve as relevant instruments.
In Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 we explore some basic statistical properties of the variables utilized.
Table 4.1 presents basic summary statistics. Among the five crime categories street crime has the
highest mean rate for years 2009-2010, which can be safely attributed to its broad definition (see the
Appendix), followed by damage to property, drug-related offenses and then, property crime, namely
theft in/ from motor vehicles and by burglary of a dwelling. The latter has the minimum number
of cases reported per 100,000 inhabitants - only 4 - for Hildburghausen (State of Thuringia) in year
2009. On the opposite direction, the highest housing burglaries rate was met in Aachen for 2009 in
western Germany (State of North Rhine-Westphalia). Theft in/ from motor vehicles is happening
more frequently than housing burglaries, with minimum reported cases per 100,000 inhabitants
in Oberallgäu (Bavaria) and maximum in Bremen for 2009. For the rest of the categories, we
find that damage to property was soaring in Brandenburg a.d.Havel (Brandenburg) in 2010, drug-
related offenses in Frankfurt am Main (Hesse) during 2009, and street crime in Aachen - again -
for 2009. Further districts that can be characterized as crime-free are the rural Nienburg (Weser)
in Lower Saxony for 2009 (damage to property), the rural Rheingau-Taunus in Hesse (drugs) for
2010, and rural Bayreuth for 2010 in Bavaria (street crime). On average, drug-related crime cases
25See Blanchard and Katz (1992) p.49 for an explanation on the validity and relevance of instruments built in the
same spirit.
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are most successfully solved, around 96%, whereas all other categories have much lower average
clearance rates, from 17% for theft in/ from motor vehicles to about 27% for damage to property.
Interestingly, we can see that for theft by burglary of a dwelling and theft in/ from motor vehicles
the clearance rates are above 100%. The German Federal Criminal Police Office reports that this
can be the case if unsolved offenses from previous years are transferred and solved during the current
year.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Theft By Burglary of a Dwelling Rate 106.345 94.548 4.046 680.601
Clearance Rate 23.659 13.440 0.000 113.300
Theft in/ from Motor Vehicles Rate 221.542 189.746 26.058 1543.084
Clearance Rate 16.967 11.375 0.000 115.200
Damage to Property Rate 854.518 358.413 221.596 4203.269
Clearance Rate 26.920 6.618 12.100 90.800
Drug-related Offenses Rate 278.019 173.527 49.048 1163.593
Clearance Rate 95.727 4.003 31.900 100
Street Crime Rate 1452.143 775.440 347.259 5100.495
Clearance Rate 22.127 5.736 9.900 63.900
Unemployment Rate 7.521 3.354 1.900 19.800
Age 15-25 7.078 3.233 1.800 17.600
Unemployment Share 3.824 1.886 1.060 10.046
Male 7.648 3.478 1.700 20.200
Female 7.391 3.272 2.200 19.300
Foreign 16.361 6.247 3.500 45.800
Per Worker Income 56110.770 9333.646 38805 110301
Proportion Graduates without 6.543 2.367 1.879 17.781
Secondary Education Qualification
Proportion Graduates with General 29.672 9.668 5.737 64.234
Higher Education Entrance Qualification
Proportion Males Age 15-25 5.810 0.526 4.353 7.469
Proportion Foreigners 7.240 4.476 0.745 25.770
Population Density 521.054 676.925 38.624 4505.954
Note: 804 observations for years 2009 and 2010.
Turning to unemployment rates, foreign unemployment is on average double than the rest of
the categories. It is striking to see that in the district of Oder-Spree in the State of Brandenburg
foreign unemployment was as high as 45.8% in 2009. Furthermore, we find Aachen (overall, youth,
male, and female unemployment) to have the highest unemployment rates for 2009. The list of low-
unemployment rates districts includes the rural district of Eichstätt in Bavaria for 2010 (overall,
youth, male and female unemployment) and the rural district Dingolfing-Landau - again in Bavaria
- for the same year (foreign unemployment). The general impression from summary statistics on
our key variables, i.e. crime and unemployment rates, directs to an association of high property
crime and unemployment in Aachen and low crime-unemployment in Bavaria.
The average income per worker is around 56,000 euros with large dispersions: about 39,000 in the
urban district of Eisenach in Thuringia in 2009, while more than 110,000 euros in the rural district
of Munich in Bavaria for 2010. In 2010 the rural district of Unterallgäu in Bavaria had a proportion
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of graduates without secondary education qualification as low as 1.9%, whereas during 2009 the
urban district of Potsdam in Brandenburg had a proportion of graduates with higher education
entrance qualification as high as 64%. On average, around 6% of the population is males of age
15 to 25, while foreigners amount to about 7% of the population. At the extremes, the most vivid
presence of foreigners can be found in the urban district of Offenbach in 2010 (State of Hesse), i.e.
approximately 26%, and the most disperse in the rural district of Sömmerda for the same year (State
of Thuringia). Finally, the most sparsely populated district was the rural Prignitz in Brandenburg
for 2010 - only 39 inhabitants per square kilometer - and the most densely populated was the city
of Munich for the same year.
The weight matrix,Wn, parametrizes spatial dependencies. For our empirical exercise we consider
as neighbors districts that share immediate geographical proximity. This specification suffices to
capture plausible commuting times in Germany and the possibility that, for instance, an agent lives
in Offenbach or Bad Vilbel and works in Frankfurt, as proposed in the theoretical spatial setting of
Section 3.26 Construction of the weights matrix requires a shapefile, which can be downloaded from
the German Federal Office of Cartography and Geodesy.27 Elements wii on the main diagonal of the
402× 402 contiguity matrix Wn take value zero, as no district is a neighbor to itself. Element wij
takes value one if districts i and j share common borders and zero otherwise. Although not dictated
by the theoretical model, we apply row-normalization so that a spatial effect can be interpreted as
the average effect of the neighbors just as in the linear-in-means model. Table 4.2 below provides
summary statistics for the weights matrix.
Table 4.2: Weights Matrix Summary Statistics
Links Values
Total 2106 Min 0
Min 1 Min>0 0.083
Mean 5.239 Mean 0.002
Max 12 Max 1
In total there exist 2,106 links. At the extremes, only one district has 12 neighbors,28 whereas 27
districts have only one neighbor,29 all urban districts surrounded by a rural district. On average,
a district has approximately 5 neighbors. The minimum positive value of the matrix is 0.083
corresponding to the single district with 12 links and the maximum 1 corresponding to the 27
districts with one neighboring district.
As mentioned above, Anselin, Cohen, Cook, Gorr, and Tita (2000) discuss the role of space
for crime and misspecification as aftermath of ignoring spatial dependence. Along their line of
argument, we test with Moran’s I spatial correlation in the variables as well as in the residuals from
26We have considered construction of the weight matrix based on commuting times as in Patacchini and Zenou (2007)
or Patacchini and Zenou (2012). This entails calculation between the centroids of the polygons or - put more
simply - the centers of the districts. Our choice adheres to the German reality, since it is rather uncommon to
commute daily from districts not immediately adjacent. Even if this is the case, our specification is simply more
primitive and a commuting time based weight matrix is expected to only improve our empirical findings.
27http://www.bkg.bund.de/EN/Home/homepage__node.html__nnn=true
28LK Ludwigshafen.
29SK Flensburg, SK Wilhelmshaven, SK Trier, SK Pirmasens, SK Heilbronn, SK Baden-Baden , SK Rosenheim, LK
Berchtesgadener Land, SK Landshut, SK Passau, SK Straubing, SK Amberg, SK Regensburg, SK Weiden i.d.OPf.,
SK Bamberg, SK Bayreuth, SK Coburg, SK Hof, SK Ansbach, SK Schweinfurt, SK Würzburg, SK Kaufbeuren,
SK Kempten, SK Cottbus, SK Rostock-Hansestadt, SK Halle (Salle) and SK Weimar.
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the regression of the aspatial model for each year, i.e. 2009 and 2010, using the row-normalized
matrix Wn described in Table 4.2. Rejection of the null hypothesis of uncorrelation between the
variable and its spatial lag renders misleading any results from aspatial specifications (see Arbia,
2014, for details) and dictates addressing the cross-sectional dependence. In Table 4.3 we present
Moran’s I statistic for testing spatial correlation.
Table 4.3: Moran I’s Tests for Spatial Correlation
year 2009 2010
Variable I Z-Score P-value I Z-Score P-value
Theft by Burglary of a Dwelling Rate 0.638 19.370 0.000 0.705 21.318 0.000
Clearance Rate 0.376 11.405 0.000 0.365 11.110 0.000
OLS Residuals 0.625 18.841 0.000 0.505 15.245 0.000
Theft in/ from Motor Vehicles Rate 0.406 12.413 0.000 0.434 13.209 0.000
Clearance Rate 0.050 1.568 0.058 0.185 5.726 0.000
OLS Residuals 0.443 13.378 0.000 0.343 10.378 0.000
Damage to Property Rate 0.264 8.135 0.000 0.238 7.45 0.000
Clearance Rate 0.313 9.683 0.000 0.425 12.846 0.000
OLS Residuals 0.262 7.959 0.000 0.218 6.653 0.000
Drug-related Offenses Rate 0.090 2.799 0.003 0.079 2.450 0.007
Clearance Rate 0.100 3.429 0.000 0.304 9.254 0.000
OLS Residuals 0.228 6.919 0.000 0.213 6.475 0.000
Street Crime Rate 0.406 12.291 0.000 0.411 12.451 0.000
Clearance Rate 0.318 9.705 0.000 0.393 11.873 0.000
OLS Residuals 0.539 16.272 0.000 0.432 13.063 0.000
Unemployment Rate 0.701 21.120 0.000 0.701 21.124 0.000
Age 15-25 0.700 21.102 0.000 0.708 21.336 0.000
Unemployment Share 0.760 22.906 0.000 0.765 23.079 0.000
Male 0.696 20.986 0.000 0.702 21.162 0.000
Female 0.693 20.904 0.000 0.687 20.702 0.000
Foreign 0.653 19.693 0.000 0.670 20.172 0.000
Per Worker Income 0.388 11.819 0.000 0.358 10.893 0.000
Proportion Graduates without 0.384 11.621 0.000 0.530 16.028 0.000Secondary Education Qualification
Proportion Graduates with General 0.451 13.613 0.000 0.246 7.478 0.000Higher Education Entrance Qualification
Proportion Males Age 15-25 0.507 15.319 0.000 0.621 18.726 0.000
Proportion Foreigners 0.534 16.130 0.000 0.536 16.203 0.000
Population Density 0.292 8.905 0.000 0.284 8.683 0.000
Note: OLS residuals from the regression of (log) crime rates on clearance rates, unemployment rate age 15-25, (log)
income per worker, proportion of graduates without secondary education qualification, proportion of graduates with
general higher education entrance qualification, proportion males age 15-25, proportion foreigners and population
density - standard errors clustered at the district.
The Z-score determines whether we can reject the null hypothesis and when it’s statistically
significant, Moran I’s values close to 1 signify spatial clustering, while values close to -1 dispersion.30
Values close to 0 indicate random spatial patterns. Apart from clearance rates for theft in/from
motor vehicles for year 2009, there is aﬄuent statistical evidence of positive spatial correlation
30An example of perfect negative spatial correlation is the chessboard.
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in the variables as well as the OLS residuals of an aspatial model with youth unemployment.31
Theft by burglary of a dwelling displays the highest spatial clustering among the crime categories,
while drug-related offenses the lowest. One of our key set of variables, unemployment rates, are also
highly positively correlated in space, something that brings more confidence to spatial specifications
in estimation.
5 Estimation Results
We start exploring the effect of unemployment on crime by means of a spatial lag model with
both district and time fixed effects as in equation (4.2). Table 5.1 below collects for each crime
category (theft by burglary of a dwelling, theft in/ from motor vehicles, damage to property, drug-
related crime and street crime) estimates on the endogenous spatial crime effect (λ) as well as
unemployment categories (unemployment rate, unemployment rate age 15 to 25, unemployment
share 15 to 25, male/ female / foreign unemployment) treating the latter as exogenous. This
specification enjoys simplicity as it assumes a single endogenous variable, i.e. neighbors’ crime rates.
We consecutively endogenize unemployment rates and display results under Table 5.2, where we
compare and quantify possible biases from ignoring reverse causality; the latter specification entails
two endogenous parameters, i.e. neighbors’ crime rates and own unemployment rates. Finally, we
turn to estimation of the full spatial model under equation (4.1) and gather raw estimates under
Table (5.3). In this case, the spatial Durbin model considers three endogenous variables, namely
neighbors’ crime rates, own and neighbors’ unemployment rates. Following LeSage and Pace (2009),
we incorporate the time-invariant spatial multiplier matrix (In − λWn)−1 in order to capture the
propagation of spatial spillovers for the estimated model of Table 5.3 and present these impacts
in Table 5.4. As mentioned above, results are obtained by the two-step GMM estimator. In all
cases, we provide three test statistics that ensure the quality of the estimator: first, a test for
underidentification, meaning testing whether the matrix of reduced-form coefficients on excluded
instruments has full column rank. Second, a test for weak identification, which in a broad sense
corresponds to obtaining a first-stage F-statistic on excluded instruments greater than 10 in the
presence of a single endogenous variable. Third, a test for overidentifying restrictions to verify that
excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the equation.32 For subsequent estimation and
interpretation we consider models that pass all three tests.
At the first rows of Table 5.1 we display estimates for the endogenous spatial crime effect (λ) as
well as the various unemployment categories for property crime.33 The first stages can be found
under Table 6.1 of the Appendix 6, where we deploy five excluded instruments based on predicted
growths in employees, first, under age 20 and its spatial lag, second, age 20 to 25, third, under
part-time contract and, fourth, under full-time contract. For theft by burglary of a dwelling we
uncover a positive and statistically significant autoregressive parameter ranging from 0.765 in male
unemployment to 0.804 in foreign unemployment rate. The share of unemployed age 15 to 25 and
the foreign unemployment rate do not have a significant effect on the (log) of theft by burglary
of a dwelling rate, but the rest of the unemployment categories are highly statistically significant
with a magnitude around 5%. All six specifications are identified, since the test statistic for the
31The findings are similar for the other unemployment categories.
32For details see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007).
33Estimates on the rest of the variables are available upon request.
24
underidentification test is large and with a p-value of 0.000 we reject the null hypothesis that
the equation is underidentified. Although the latter ensures that correlations between excluded
instruments and the endogenous variable are nonzero, it does not ensure that these correlations are
large enough, i.e. lack of a weak instruments problem. Therefore, we exploit the weak identification
test, whose test statistic allows to reject 5% maximal IV relative bias, the rejection meaning that
there is improvement in terms of incurred bias comparing with the OLS bias counterpart. Lastly, the
failure to reject the null hypothesis of the overidentification test signifies that excluded instruments
are valid and appropriately exogenous. In general, we note that a p-value of at least 0.05 is required
to be comfortable with validity of excluded instruments. Turning to theft in/ from motor vehicles,
we observe that the spatial autoregressive parameter is less significant and lower in magnitude -
around 0.5 - than in theft by burglary of a dwelling, apart from foreign unemployment. Results
on the share age 15 to 25 and foreign unemployment linger and for the rest of the unemployment
categories are slightly higher. Although this crime category enjoys very strong first stages except for
the foreign unemployment rate, and exogeneity of excluded instruments, we fail to reject the null of
underidentification. In this case one or more of the correlations between the excluded instruments
and the single endogenous variable is zero, which suggests possible re-examination of instruments
for theft in/ from motor vehicles.
Damage to property estimation suffers from both weak instruments and rejection of excluded
instruments exogeneity, although the equation is in all cases identified. Therefore, we consider per-
formance of the spatial lag econometric model poor and do not comment further as it seems our
excluded instruments merit from revision for damage to property. For drug-related offenses the
equations are underidentified, but excluded instruments seem strong and exogenous. As expected
from Moran’s I test in Table 4.3, the spatial autoregressive parameter is positive but insignificant,
which implies that drug-related offenses is a crime category whose specification can be safely for-
mulated as aspatial with respect to neighboring crime, but spatial with reference to the rest of the
exogenous variables. Finally, we see that our estimator performs poorly also for street crime, since
the autoregressive parameter is in all cases greater than one. This result signals misspecification,
because the parameter space for the autoregressive parameter can be taken as (−1, 1) due to the
row-normalization of the weights matrix. As a conclusion, although in Table 4.3 we have established
the presence of significant spatial correlation for damage to property and street crime as well as
for the set of explanatory variables, estimation of the spatial lag model as in equation (4.2) does
not perform satisfactorily for the three non-property crime categories. One possible solution is con-
sidering specifications that exclude the endogenous crime spatial component and focus on spatial
spillovers on the rest of the regressors as proposed for drug-related offenses.34 Notwithstanding, the
latter econometric model is not interesting per se as it does not explicitly capture simultaneity and
spatial dependence in crime rates as dictated by the theoretical setup.
In Table 5.2 we turn to more causal approaches regarding property crime, that is we instrument
unemployment rate categories and the unemployment share age 15 to 25. Again, details on the first
stages for the spatial lag of (log) crime rates and unemployment can be found in Appendix 6. As we
increase the number of endogenous variables from one to two, the weak identification test statistic
decreases in comparison with Table 5.1. The least biased estimates - rejection of at least 10% max-
imal IV relative bias - belong to the share age 15 to 25, male and foreign unemployment for theft
34Results are available upon request.
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Table 5.1: Endogenous Crime Spatial Effects with Exogenous Unemployment
(log) Crime Rate CSL UR CSL UR 15-25 CSL US 15-25 CSL Male UR CSL Female UR CSL Foreign UR
Theft by Burglary 0.773*** 0.057*** 0.767*** 0.049*** 0.779*** 0.037 0.765*** 0.051*** 0.791*** 0.059*** 0.804*** 0.001
of a Dwelling (0.207) (0.014) (0.206) (0.015) (0.207) (0.028) (0.207) (0.016) (0.207) (0.015) (0.209) (0.011)
Test for:
Underidentification 82.632 [0.000] 82.262 [0.000] 81.749 [0.000] 82.487 [0.000] 82.814 [0.000] 82.577 [0.000]
Weak Identification 22.848 22.772 22.679 22.874 22.758 22.988
Overidentification 6.675 [0.1541] 5.718 [0.221] 6.931 [0.140] 6.574 [0.160] 7.024 [0.135] 7.750 [0.101]
Theft in/ From 0.522** 0.080*** 0.486** 0.051** 0.462** 0.038 0.592** 0.084*** 0.412** 0.073*** 0.837* 0.023*
Motor Vehicles (0.226) (0.019) (0.233) (0.020) (0.193) (0.028) (0.250) (0.019) (0.205) (0.019) (0.430) (0.013)
Test for:
Underidentification 6.725 [0.242] 6.813 [0.235] 7.288 [0.200] 6.513 [0.259] 7.030 [0.218] 6.226 [0.285]
Weak Identification 34.161 33.642 34.005 31.760 37.499 14.748
Overidentification 3.324 [0.505] 4.490 [0.344] 4.548 [0.337] 3.499 [0.478] 3.188 [0.527] 3.409 [0.492]
Damage to 0.956** 0.046*** 0.917** 0.033*** 0.807** 0.022 0.924** 0.044*** 0.972** 0.045*** 0.964** 0.011*
Property (0.401) (0.014) (0.396) (0.013) (0.399) (0.014) (0.396) (0.013) (0.406) (0.015) (0.412) (0.006)
Test for:
Underidentification 34.026 [0.000] 33.740 [0.000] 35.337 [0.000] 33.769 [0.000] 34.351 [0.000] 30.554 [0.000]
Weak Identification 5.764 5.800 6.075 5.838 5.720 5.654
Overidentification 10.391 [0.034] 11.198 [0.024] 10.153 [0.038] 11.012 [0.026] 9.579 [0.048] 9.967 [0.0410]
Drug-related 0.342 0.001 0.203 -0.005 0.064 -0.033 0.333 0.008 0.303 -0.009 0.225 0.003
Offenses (0.692) (0.009) (0.667) (0.009) (0.671) (0.022) (0.687) (0.008) (0.684) (0.013) (0.658) (0.004)
Test for:
Underidentification 6.392 [0.270] 6.324 [0.276] 5.912 [0.315] 6.447 [0.265] 6.312 [0.277] 6.499 [0.261]
Weak Identification 26.366 26.518 25.415 25.828 27.298 22.074
Overidentification 7.164 [0.127] 7.582 [0.108] 7.389 [0.117] 6.789 [0.147] 7.506 [0.111] 7.156 [0.128]
Street Crime - 0.061*** - 0.039*** - 0.014 - 0.056*** - 0.061*** - 0.015**
Test for: (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.006)
Underidentification 80.275 [0.000] 82.493 [0.000] 83.612 [0.000] 80.372 [0.000] 80.741 [0.000] 82.543 [0.000]
Weak Identification 43.495 43.751 45.400 42.056 45.588 33.138
Overidentification 8.175 [0.085] 6.981 [0.137] 3.321 [0.506] 10.130 [0.038] 6.272 [0.180] 6.642 [0.156]
Note: 804 observations for years 2009 and 2010. CSL denotes the crime spatial lag, UR the unemployment rate, US the unemployment share and “-” a value greater than 1. Results with
district fixed effects and time fixed effects further including (time-lagged) clearance rates, (log) income per worker, proportion of graduates without secondary education qualification, proportion
of graduates with general higher education entrance qualification, proportion males age 15-25, proportion foreigners and population density. Excluded instruments are the predicted growth in
employees under age 20 and its spatial lag, predicted growth in employees age 20 to 25, predicted growth in part/ full-time employees. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses
and p-values in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Critical values for weak identification test: 18.37 for 5% maximal IV relative bias, 10.83 for 10% maximal
IV relative bias.
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by burglary of a dwelling and the share age 15 to 25 for theft in/ from motor vehicles. In all cases
except for foreign unemployment in theft by burglary of a dwelling we appropriately cannot reject
the null of excluded instruments’ validity. Theft in/ from motor vehicles continues to suffer from un-
deridentification and none of the autoregressive parameter - unemployment estimates is statistically
significant. Empirical findings for theft by burglary of a dwelling are more convincing. The test of
underidentification fails to reject the null only for female and foreign unemployment rates. For the
rest of the categories the autoregressive parameter estimates slightly decrease in comparison to the
respective estimates from Table 5.1, whereas the unemployment magnitude increases substantially
and is significant for the rate age 15 to 25. These estimates may not represent the true impact of
unemployment on property crime for two reasons: first, because they do not take into account the
spatial multiplier effect, (In − λWn)−1, and second, they neglect possible spatial effects for variables
other than the dependent, the magnitude and direction of which is not necessarily the same as the
own effects. Regarding the former, since the crime spatial effect is positive we expect the impact of
unemployment to be higher than the estimate of Table 5.2. We explore the calculation of the exact
expressions below.
In Table 5.3 we present estimation results corresponding to model under equation (4.1) for theft by
burglary of a dwelling. We show estimates on parameters for the full set of explanatory variables to
shed light on the difference in effects coming from the observation i itself (own effect) and from other
observations j 6= i on i (neighbors’ or spatial effect). Starting from the tests, we cannot reject the
null of overidentification for all unemployment categories verifying that our excluded instruments
are exogenous in the sense that they are uncorrelated with the residuals. Next we see that the
only specifications identified are the unemployment rate and share age 15 to 25 with p-values 0.020
and 0.000 respectively. For the same categories we detect no weak instruments problem with less
bias for the share of youth unemployment. For these two categories the autoregressive parameter
is statistically significant, with magnitude just below 0.8 and higher than the specification without
exogenous spatial effects of Table 5.2. Moreover, not only is the effect of own youth unemployment
rate and share positive and more prominent than in Table 5.2, but also we verify the existence of
a negative and highly significant spatial unemployment effect, meaning an effect stemming from
neighboring districts and affecting theft by burglary of a dwelling in the opposite direction than
unemployment in the district itself. This is in line with our main theoretical model, which predicted
that the effect on crime will depend on the elasticity of the labor market tightness as stated formally
in part 3 of Proposition 3.3.
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Table 5.2: Endogenous Crime Spatial Effects with Endogenous Unemployment
(log) Crime Rate CSL UR CSL UR 15-25 CSL US 15-25 CSL Male UR CSL Female UR CSL Foreign UR
Theft by Burglary 0.705*** 0.244 0.694*** 0.189** 0.692*** 0.184* 0.687*** 0.173 0.786*** 0.455 0.848*** -0.023
of a Dwelling (0.218) (0.154) (0.215) (0.093) (0.213) (0.112) (0.220) (0.114) (0.230) (0.287) (0.219) (0.043)
Test for:
Underidentification 10.017 [0.040] 22.461 [0.000] 33.383 [0.000] 14.213 [0.007] 3.516 [0.475] 6.357 [0.174]
Weak Identification 6.607 6.749 8.908 13.070 0.683 19.866
Overidentification 4.465 [0.215] 2.491 [0.477] 4.614 [0.202] 4.852 [0.183] 3.773 [0.287] 8.606 [0.035]
Theft in/ From 0.508* 0.067 0.325 -0.054 0.266 -0.101 0.510 0.040 0.390* 0.142 0.658 0.015
Motor Vehicles (0.277) (0.150) (0.280) (0.079) (0.350) (0.097) (0.324) (0.119) (0.221) (0.202) (1.116) (0.060)
Test for:
Underidentification 6.287 [0.170] 6.495 [0.165] 6.086 [0.193] 6.247 [0.181] 3.674 [0.452] 2.331 [0.675]
Weak Identification 2.259 8.338 16.183 4.370 0.714 0.468
Overidentification 3.363 [0.339] 3.540 [0.316] 3.006 [0.391] 3.512 [0.319] 2.851 [0.415] 2.995 [0.392]
Note: 804 observations for years 2009 and 2010. CSL denotes the crime spatial lag, UR the unemployment rate and US the unemployment share. Results with district fixed effects and time fixed
effects further including (time-lagged) clearance rates, (log) income per worker, proportion of graduates without secondary education qualification, proportion of graduates with general higher
education entrance qualification, proportion males age 15-25, proportion foreigners and population density. Excluded instruments are the predicted growth in employees under age 20 and its
spatial lag, predicted growth in employees age 20 to 25, predicted growth in part/ full-time employees. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses and p-values in brackets. *, **,
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Critical values for weak identification test: 13.97 for 5% maximal IV relative bias, 8.78 for 10% maximal IV relative bias.
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Table 5.3: Theft by Burglary of a Dwelling: Endogenous and Exogenous Spatial Effects
UR UR 15-25 US 15-25 Male UR Female UR Foreign UR
Own Unemployment 0.151 0.286*** 0.525*** 0.047 0.579 0.254
(0.177) (0.098) (0.147) (0.122) (0.370) (0.449)
Spatial Unemployment -1.335*** -0.472*** -0.785*** -1.379*** -0.871*** -1.654
(0.270) (0.131) (0.160) (0.342) (0.193) (2.106)
Crime Spatial Lag 0.800** 0.765** 0.785*** - 0.835** -
(0.335) (0.300) (0.302) (0.351)
(lag) Clearance Rate -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003* -0.003** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Per Worker Income 0.167 0.000 0.042 0.421 -0.449 -0.823
(0.327) (0.262) (0.267) (0.334) (0.480) (1.355)
Proportion Graduates 0.009 0.020* 0.013 0.001 0.023 0.064
without SEQ (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.091)
Proportion Graduates -0.009* -0.006 -0.008 -0.012** -0.008 0.001
with GHEEQ (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.032)
Proportion Males 0.076 -0.312* -0.463** 0.171 -0.596 -0.439
Age 15-25 (0.208) (0.178) (0.190) (0.180) (0.523) (0.884)
Proportion Foreigners -0.244** -0.098 -0.155* -0.235** -0.198 -0.776
(0.114) (0.093) (0.094) (0.103) (0.130) (0.805)
Population Density -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Spatial Effects
(lag) Clearance Rate 0.008*** 0.004 0.004 0.010*** 0.004 0.020
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.022)
Per Worker Income 1.416** -0.447 -0.363 1.393** 0.531 7.769
(0.672) (0.568) (0.537) (0.686) (0.814) (10.030)
Proportion Graduates -0.098*** -0.066*** -0.061*** -0.097*** -0.067*** -0.056
without SEQ (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.138)
Proportion Graduates 0.010 0.013* 0.015** 0.013 0.011 -0.089
with GHEEQ (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.142)
Proportion Males 2.035*** 0.362 0.367 1.922*** 0.974 7.177
Age 15-25 (0.578) (0.295) (0.271) (0.613) (0.735) (8.605)
Proportion Foreigners 0.498* 0.554** 0.540** 0.522** 0.654* -1.437
(0.273) (0.255) (0.248) (0.256) (0.351) (2.692)
Population Density 0.006*** 0.003 0.004** 0.003 0.004 0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011)
Test for:
Underidentification 2.300 [0.512] 9.878 [0.020] 19.929 [0.000] 2.463 [0.482] 3.557 [0.313] 0.456 [0.928]
Weak Identification 6.264 8.392 12.239 4.475 1.334 0.089
Overidentification 2.938 [0.230] 1.442 [0.486] 0.761 [0.684] 3.589 [0.166] 1.236 [0.539] 0.309 [0.857]
Note: 804 observations for years 2009 and 2010. UR denotes the unemployment rate, US the unemployment share, “-” a value
greater than 1, SEQ secondary education qualification, and GHEEQ general higher education qualification. Theft by burglary
of a dwelling is in logs. Results with district fixed effects and time fixed effects further including (time-lagged) clearance rates,
(log) income per worker, proportion of graduates without secondary education qualification, proportion of graduates with general
higher education entrance qualification, proportion males age 15 to 25, proportion foreigners and population density. Excluded
instruments are the predicted growth in employees under age 20 and its spatial lag, predicted growth in employees age 20 to
25, predicted growth in part/ full-time employees. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses and p-values in
brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Critical values for weak identification test: 9.53 for 5%
maximal IV relative bias, 6.61 for 10% maximal IV relative bias.
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With reference to other own effects, we note that the lag of the clearance rate affects negatively
and in a significant manner both the rate and share of youth unemployment, but the extent of
the effect is negligible especially with comparison to the unemployment estimate. An increase of
per worker income in the home region does not seem to affect crime rates, since the magnitude is
(very close to) zero and lacks statistical significance. The same holds for the next two variables,
i.e. the proportion of graduates without secondary education qualification and with general higher
education entrance qualification. Nevertheless, the first enters with a positive sign and the second
with a negative, roughly meaning that had these effects been of larger magnitude and of statistical
significance, an increase of unskilled labor in the home region would be associated with an increase
in crime rates while an increase in the prospective high-skilled youth population with a decrease
in housing burglary rates. Interestingly, the proportion of young males in the home district has a
negative sign and is significant for the share of youth unemployment. Even more interestingly, we
find that the proportion of foreigners in the home population cannot be associated with crime rates.
Last, although population density in the home region is significant at 5%, the estimated coefficient
is very close to zero.
Turning to the spatial effects of Table 5.3, we see that for the youth unemployment rate the
proportion of graduates without secondary education qualification as well as the proportion of
foreigners in districts other than the domicile have a significant effect on theft by burglary of a
dwelling, while this extends to the proportion of graduates with general higher education entrance
qualification and population density for the share of unemployment among the young. Combining
the latter empirical findings with the noticeable change in both autoregressive and unemployment
estimated parameters of Table 5.3 as compared to Table 5.2, reveals the virtue of employing equation
(4.1) instead of neglecting spatial effects other than the crime rate as in (4.2). Further advantages of
the full spatial specification become clear as we translate the estimated unemployment coefficients for
the youth rate and share into marginal effects. The impact from changing unemployment in the home
district embodies not only the own effect but also any possible indirect feedbacks from neighboring
districts through the spatial multiplier matrix (In − λWn)−1. Since own and neighboring effects
move to opposite directions, we expect the impact from a change in unemployment in district i on
(log) theft by burglary of a dwelling in district i - coined as an average direct impact (ADI) - to be
smaller than the estimated coefficient, i.e. 0.286 for the rate and 0.525 for the share. Furthermore,
we anticipate the impact from a change in unemployment in district j on (log) theft by burglary of
a dwelling in district i - coined as the average indirect impact (AII) - to have a negative sign, just
as the estimated coefficients, i.e. -0.472 and -0.785 for the rate and share respectively. The overall
impact from a change in unemployment stemming either from the domicile or foreign districts - the
average total impact (ATI) will crucially depend on the magnitudes of the ADI and AII, as those
affect crime rates in opposite directions and will tend to cancel each other out.
Indeed, as obvious from Table 5.4, our initial expectations with respect to unemployment are
confirmed. First, the ADI of the spatial lag model in equation (4.2) is slightly higher than the
respective estimates for the rate and share, namely 0.189 and 0.184 respectively as seen from Table
5.2. This increase is attributable to the feedback loop induced by the presence of a positive spatial
autoregressive parameter (0.694 and 0.692 for the rate and share respectively). Although the ADI
is almost the same between the rate and share of youth unemployment, it is statistically significant
only for the rate. The AII and ATI are positive, i.e. bear the same sign as the ADI, but are not
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statistically significance - not even at 10%. Hence, we conclude that the spatial autoregressive model
treating unemployment as endogenous and excluding spatial effects from the rest of the explanatory
variables provides evidence that an increase in youth unemployment rates at the home district
results in an increase in theft by burglary of a dwelling. Second, as we turn to the more complete
specification of the spatial Durbin model under equation (4.1), we verify that the inclusion of spatial
effects other than crime rates reduces the impact from an increase in unemployment in the home
district, since the ADI for both rates and shares is smaller than the estimate of Table 5.3 (compare
0.219 with 0.286 and 0.420 with 0.525). Again, none of the AII and ATI are significant, so that we
cannot associate changes in neighboring districts’ unemployment rates/ shares with changes in theft
by burglary of a dwelling in the home district. Notwithstanding, the spatial autoregressive model
treating unemployment and its spatial lag as endogenous while including spatial effects for the rest
of the variables, is capable of predicting a positive and highly significant - both economically and
statistically - effect of the youth unemployment share on housing burglaries for the crisis period in
Germany.
Table 5.4: Theft by Burglary of a Dwelling: Impacts for Unemployment Rate and Share Age 15-25
Spatial Lag of Table 5.2 Spatial Durbin of Table 5.3
ADI AII ATI ADI AII ATI
Unemployment Rate Age 15 to 25 0.217** 0.401 0.618 0.219* -1.009 -0.790
(0.105) (0.419) (0.048) (0.123) (1.157) (1.150)
Unemployment Share Age 15 to 25 0.211* 0.387 0.598 0.420** -1.628 -1.208
(0.123) (0.393) (0.467) (0.180) (1.890) (1.881)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10% and ** at 5%.
These results are in accordance with findings in other countries, e.g. France (see Fougère, Kra-
marz, and Pouget, 2009), where, first, the distinction between rate and share of youth unemployment
points to different directions regarding the causal impact on crime, and second, where the effect
pertains to youth as opposed to overall unemployment; as mentioned above, the aftermath of the
global financial crisis in Germany has reportedly affected mainly younger persons.35 Moreover,
our empirical exercise not only fits the main predictions of the conceptual framework unfolded in
Section 3 regarding property as opposed to violent crime, but also the empirical regularity that
housing burglaries increase in time of recessions along with unemployment, whereas motor vehicle
theft is counter-cyclical. Here, let us repeat the distinction on motor vehicle theft and theft from
motor vehicles, the latter being the category we explore with regional data. The fact that the ADI
of youth unemployment share is positive and significant has interesting policy implications at the
district level, since it reveals that such interplays among districts can be exploited when designing
unemployment-related policy, for instance deciding on unemployment benefits (in connection to
our theory, unemployment benefits increase threshold productivity which, in turn, positively affects
crime rate, see decision choices (3.4) and crime wage (3.9)).
The region approach allows emphasizing a need for national or federal level decisions. This is be-
cause labor movements affect not only labor market but also criminal activities. This is particularly
crucial when the composition of labor force starts changing - as is the case with European labor
markets whose youth find very hard time in securing a job while at the same time low turnover for
35We have calculated impacts for West and East Germany separately, but found no important differences.
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permanent positions is occupied by older generation (see Cahuc, Carcillo, Rinne, and Zimmermann,
2013, for a comparison between France and Germany). This two-tier (or dual) market creates ex-
ternalities on crime, a point not emphasized by theorists or practitioners. As illustrated, youth
unemployment is crucial, and spatial dimension matters significantly, therefore, national decisions
are necessary.
6 Conclusions
The case of Germany in studying spatial aspects of the labor markets such as the nexus between
unemployment and crime rates is undoubtedly interesting, because evidently the country’s economy
has survived the 2008 financial crisis. In tackling this case, we allow for changes in job seekers
through, among others, influx of migrants to cause changes in threshold and crime wages. These,
in turn, shape steady states of crime and unemployment. This emphasizes spatial competition:
adjustments in the domestic labor market depends on the elasticity of labor market tightness whereas
productivity of incomers affects the equilibrium in home market through reservation and crime
wages. Moreover, our introduction of match productivities allows shedding some light on witnessing
phenomena of riots and looting with protagonists young, low-educated and unemployed males.
Perfectly, since the processes under consideration are dynamic and effects manifest with the
elapse of time, the model should expand time horizon and include not only spatial but also time
spillovers.36 Furthermore, in a system setting one can accommodate policy competition spillovers
among administrative districts regarding welfare benefits or police expenditures, which are also
suspected to be correlated with unemployment and criminal activity.37 As mentioned above, oper-
ationalizing our theoretical setup with a spatial Durbin model entails three endogenous variables,
although causality pertains to a single variable, i.e. unemployment. As an alternative we suggest
modeling not the reaction function, but the time-lagged adjustment to neighbors’ crime rates. The
learning component, WnYn,t−1, incorporates the spatio-temporal dynamic effect of crime instead
of the simultaneous interplay. At the same time, it captures spatial interaction in the dependent
variable and is - perhaps - more pragmatic in terms of policy implementation, since it assumes the
passage of time between observing a neighbor’s outcome and deciding own outcome.38
Theoretically, we foresee a number of important research directions. The literature on trade and
unemployment (see, for example, Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010, Helpman and Itskhoki,
2010, Felbermayr, Prat, and Schmerer, 2011, and Felbermayr, Larch, and Lechthaler, 2013) can
benefit from introducing effects on criminal activities after labor market adjustments, due to changes
36Our preliminary analysis shows the usefulness of the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) estimators, that can be
computed by running standard panel regressions augmented with the cross-section averages of the dependent and
independent variables. This is an approach advanced by Pesaran (2006) and applicable to panels with a single
factor or multiple unobserved factors. Moreover, as shown by Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2011), the
main results of the CCE approach continue to hold even for the unobservable common factors which follow unit
root processes.
37For large (multi-country or multi-region) systems, dimensionality might be a real obstacle. One of the solutions
is to define the neighborhood effects with a fixed number of dominant regions that have non-negligible effects on
all other areas. Pesaran and Chudik (2010) and Chudik and Pesaran (2011) demonstrate that the asymptotic
normality of the augmented least squares (ALS) estimator holds once the individual auxiliary regressions are
correctly specified. However, this requires to conduct additional analysis for specifying the dominant unit(s), the
number of the unobserved common factors (if any), and the nature of spatial contemporaneous dependencies.
38In the taxonomy of spatial panel models this specification is referred to as the pure space recursive model (Anselin,
Gallo, and Jayet, 2008). We have estimated this class of models but chose not to report the results as they fail to
pass the overidentification test.
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in trade, have taken place. Another unexploited track concerns the dual labor markets literature
(see, for example, Saint-Paul, 1996, Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado, and Le Barbanchon, 2012, and Boeri,
2011), which lacks analysis on the costs of duality, mainly being driven by large unemployment
among young and less educated people, thereby affecting crime, as demonstrated in our paper.
Finally, we still lack understanding about transitional dynamics which is partly because of data
constraints to confront theoretical results.
We consider that the literature would benefit from applying the space-embedded model of our
type to countries that undergo increasing unemployment rates and reduction in welfare benefits,
for instance, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy due to the ongoing fiscal debt crisis in Europe in an
attempt to shed light on the link of economic decline and inclination to criminal activity explicitly
dealing at the same time with the spatio-temporal spillovers. The interplay can be considered not
only within but also among European Union countries, which enjoy freedom of mobility especially
with regards to employment.
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Appendix
Reservation wage
First, we equate (3.5) to (3.6) to obtain
bj = wij (ϕ˜)− λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Wij (z)−Wij (ϕ˜)) dF (z) ,
where integration by parts yields
λ
ˆ 1
ϕ˜
(W (z)−W (ϕ˜)) dF (z) = −λ
ˆ 1
ϕ˜
W ′ (z) (1− F (z)) dz.
Differentiating equation (3.6) gives
rW ′ij (ϕ) = w′ij (ϕ)− λW ′ij (ϕ) (1− F (ϕ))− λF (ϕ˜)W ′ij (ϕ) + φW ′ij (ϕ)KWij (ϕ)
+φWij
(
KW ′ij −W ′ij (ϕ)
) (
r + λ (1− F (ϕ)) + λF (ϕ˜) + φWij pi
)
W ′ij (ϕ) = w′ij (ϕ) = β,
where the last equality follows from equation (3.10). We also used equation (3.3) to arrive at
KW ′ij = (1− pi)W ′ij (ϕ) . Therefore,
W ′ij (ϕ) =
β
r + λ (1− F (ϕ)) + λF (ϕ˜)− φWij (1− pi)
,
which we can plug back in ˆ 1
ϕ˜
(Wij (z)−Wij (ϕ˜)) dF (z) =
−β
[ˆ ϕc
ϕ˜
(1− F (z)) dz
r + λ (1− F (z)) + λF (ϕ˜) + pi +
ˆ 1
ϕc
(1− F (z)) dz
r + λ (1− F (z)) + λF (ϕ˜)
]
,
and finally obtain the reservation wage
wij (ϕ˜) = bj + λβ
[ˆ ϕc
ϕ˜
(1− F (z)) dz
r + λ (1− F (z)) + λF (ϕ˜) + pi +
ˆ 1
ϕc
(1− F (z)) dz
r + λ (1− F (z)) + λF (ϕ˜)
]
.
Crime wage
Start with the function Wij (ϕ) in equation (6.3) which returns the value of employment in a job-
worker match with current productivity ϕ. The implicit rate of return on the asset of working in
a job at productivity ϕ is equal to the current wage w (ϕ) plus the expected capital gain on the
employment relationship. The lower bound of the definite integral, ϕ˜, is the cutoff or threshold value
of match productivity, which is determined endogenously in the model. If idiosyncratic productivity
ϕ falls below ϕ˜, the match is no longer profitable and the job/ worker pair is destroyed. Introduce
a new cutoff level ϕc, recall that φWij (ϕc) = 0 and evaluate this function at it, ϕ = ϕc,
(r + λF (ϕ˜))Wij (ϕc) = wij (ϕc) + λF (ϕ˜)Uij + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Wij (z)−Wij (ϕc)) dF (z) ,
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rearranging for wage yields
wij (ϕc) = λF (ϕ˜) (Wij (ϕc)− Uij) + rWij (ϕc)− λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Wij (z)−Wij (ϕc)) dF (z)
= λF (ϕ˜) (Wij (ϕc)− Uij) + rpi (gj + piJij)− λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Wij (z)−Wij (ϕc)) dF (z)
= (λF (ϕ˜) + r)
(
gj+piJij
pi
)
− λF (ϕ˜)Uij − λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Wij (z)−Wij (ϕc)) dF (z)
= (λF (ϕ˜) + r) gjpi + rJij − λF (ϕ˜) (Uij − Jij)− λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Wij (z)−Wij (ϕc)) dF (z) ,
since rJij (ϕ)− ρ (Uij − Jij (ϕ)) = zj and given ρ = λF (ϕ˜), we end up with
wij (ϕc) = (λF (ϕ˜) + r) gjpi + zj + λβ
´ 1
ϕc
(1−F (z))dz
r+λ(1−F (z))+λF (ϕ˜) .
Notice that we are effectively dealing with the fixed point problem - the wage at crime productivity
depends on the term which is also dependent on ϕc.
Wage income: Nash bargaining
Let us first evaluate the steady-state, equilibrium valuations of states. Given our assumptions, the
continuation valuation by workers of unemployment (U), and employment (W (ϕ)), and by firms of
an open vacancy (V ) versus a job (J (ϕ)) must solve the following functional equations that equate
normal returns on capitalized valuations of labor market states to their expected periodic payouts
rUij = bj + φUij
(
KUij − Uij
)
+ θjq (θj) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij) . (6.1)
In equation (6.1), the flow yield from the valuation of the state of unemployment U at interest rate
r is equated to an expected “capital gain” stemming from finding new employment at ϕ. Further,
rVij = −cj + q (θj) [Jij (ϕ)− Vij ] . (6.2)
Equation (6.2) governs the valuation of an unfilled vacancy. Moreover,
rWij (ϕ) = wij (ϕ) + λ
ˆ 1
ϕ˜
(Wij (z)−Wij (ϕ)) dF (z)− λF (ϕ˜) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij)
+ φWij (ϕ)
(
KWij (ϕ)−Wij (ϕ)
)
. (6.3)
The function Wij (ϕ) in equation (6.3) returns the value of employment in a job-worker match with
current productivity ϕ. The implicit rate of return on the asset of working in a job at productivity ϕ
is equal to the current wage wij (ϕ) plus the expected capital gain on the employment relationship.
The lower bound of the definite integral, ϕ˜ is the cutoff or threshold value of match productivity,
determined endogenously in the model. If idiosyncratic productivity ϕ falls below ϕ˜, the match is
no longer profitable and the job/ worker pair is destroyed. Finally,
rJij (ϕ) = ϕ− w (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Jij (z)− Jij (ϕ)) dF (z) + λF (ϕ˜) (Vij − Jij (ϕ)) . (6.4)
A similar arbitrage argument determines the valuation to a firm of a filled job in equation (6.4),
given the current realization of ϕ.
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Use now V = 0 and rewrite the two asset value conditions (for jobs)39
rJij (ϕ) = ϕ− wij (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Jij (z)− Jij (ϕ)) dF (z)− λF (ϕ˜)Jij (ϕ)
= ϕ− wij (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ Jij (z) dF (z)− λ (Jij (ϕ) (1− F (ϕ˜)) + F (ϕ˜)Jij (ϕ))
= ϕ− wij (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ Jij (z) dF (z)− λJij (ϕ) ,
Jij (ϕ) = ϕ−wij(ϕ)+λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ Jij(z)dF (z)
r+λ .
Similarly with the asset value conditions for employment
rWij (ϕ) = wij (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ (Wij (z)−Wij (ϕ)) dF (z)− λF (ϕ˜) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij)
+φWij (ϕ)
(
KWij (ϕ)−Wij (ϕ)
)
= wij (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ Wij (z) dF (z) + λF (ϕ˜)Uij + φ
W
ij (ϕ) gj + φWij (ϕ)piJij −
(
λ+ φWij (ϕ)pi
)
Wij (ϕ) ,
W (ϕ) =
wij (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ Wij (z) dF (z) + λF (ϕ˜)Uij + φ
W
ij (ϕ) gj + φWij (ϕ)piJij
r + φWij (ϕ)pi + λ
.
Wage equation under the Nash bargaining rule should solve the following,
w (ϕ) = arg max (Wij (ϕ)− Uij)β (Jij (ϕ)− Vij)1−β
= arg max
(
wij(ϕ)+λ
´ 1
ϕ˜Wij(z)dF (z)−(λ(1−F (ϕ˜))+r+φWij (ϕ)pi)Uij+φWij (ϕ)gj+φWij (ϕ)piJij
r+φWij (ϕ)pi+λ
)β
×
(
ϕ−wij(ϕ)+λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ Jij(z)dF (z)−(r+λ)Vij
r+λ
)1−β
,
(6.5)
with the first-order necessary condition
β
dWij(ϕ)
dw(ϕ) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij)β−1 (Jij (ϕ)− Vij)1−β + (1− β)
dJij(ϕ)
dw(ϕ) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij)β (Jij (ϕ)− Vij)−β = 0
(Wij (ϕ)− U)β (Jij (ϕ)− Vij)1−β
(
β
dWij(ϕ)
dw(ϕ) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij)−1 + (1− β)
dJij(ϕ)
dw(ϕ) (J (ϕ)− Vij)−1
)
= 0
β
dWij(ϕ)
dw(ϕ) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij)−1 = − (1− β)
dJij(ϕ)
dw(ϕ) (Jij (ϕ)− Vij)−1
Wij (ϕ)− Uij = β(Jij(ϕ)−Vij)(1−β)
Wij (ϕ)− Uij = β (Jij (ϕ) +Wij (ϕ)− Vij − Uij) .
Now we can use the above with Vij = 0 and the FOC in equation (6.5) to obtain
(1− β) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij) = βJij (ϕ)
(1− β)
(
wij(ϕ)+λ
´ 1
ϕ˜Wij(z)dF (z)−(λ(1−F (ϕ˜))+r+φWij (ϕ)pi)Uij+φWij (ϕ)gj+φWij (ϕ)piJij
r+φWij (ϕ)pi+λ
)
= β ϕ−wij(ϕ)+λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ Jij(z)dF (z)
r+λ .
(6.6)
If we are interested in an honest equilibrium when working employees do not commit a crime,
39Using the fundamental theorem of calculus,
´ 1
ϕ˜
dF (z) = F (z) |1ϕ˜= F (1)− F (ϕ˜) = 1− F (ϕ˜).
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φWij (ϕ) = 0 or wij > C, we have
(1− β)
(
wij (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ Wij (z) dF (z)− (λ (1− F (ϕ˜)) + r)Uij
)
= β
(
ϕ− wij (ϕ) + λ
´ 1
ϕ˜ Jij (z) dF (z)
)
(1− β) (wij (ϕ)− rUij) = β (ϕ− wij (ϕ))
wij (ϕ) = βϕ+ r (1− β)Uij ,
because
β
ˆ 1
ϕ˜
Jij (z) dF (z) = (1− β)
(ˆ 1
ϕ˜
Wij (z)− Uij
)
dF (z) ,
as this term corresponds to the same sharing rule.
A closed form expression for rU is obtainable as follows:
(1− β) (Wij (ϕ)− Uij) = βJij (ϕ) .
Combining with the free entry conditions in equations (6.1) and (6.2), we obtain(
r + φUijpi
)
Uij = β1−β cjθj + bj + φUij (gj + piJij)
Jij = zj+ρUijr+ρ and Jij (ϕ) =
cj
q(θj)
rUij =
(r+ρ) β1−β cjθj+bj+φ
U
ij
(
gj+ pir+ρ zj
)
r+ρ+φUijpi
,
and plugging back into wage equation gives
wij (ϕ) = βϕ+
(r + ρ)βcjθj + (1− β) bj + (1− β)φUij
(
gj + pir+ρzj
)
r + ρ+ φUijpi
.
Finally, the wage equation for φUij = 1 becomes
wij (ϕ) = βϕ+
(r + ρ)βcjθj + (1− β) bj + (1− β)
(
gj + pir+ρzj
)
r + ρ+ pi . (6.7)
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Since productivity is isomorphic to wages, we can analyze an increase in crime-wages. From equation
(3.9), an increase is warranted if, ceteris paribus, a financial gain from a crime in region j increases,
a probability of getting caught decreases, economic volatility increases, the rate of time preference
increases, reservation wage (productivity) decreases, and the consumption of the en-jailed workers
increases in j.
Moreover, an influx of more productive employees from i to j who raise the productivity of a
match in j leads to an increase in crime in j if criminals are more sensitive to changes in match-
specific productivity than wage-earners whose earnings are above a crime wage. Note that more
productive job seekers, ceteris paribus, induce an increase in the reservation wage (productivity).
This leads to an increase in a crime rate. To see this, we need to calculate crime rate with four
segments of population. We split employed into ELji which earn less than a crime wage wij (ϕ) < Cij ,
and those that earn more, EHji , wij (ϕ) ≥ Cij .
First, unemployed is composed of those employed whose matches are dissolved at rate λF (ϕ˜) and
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those released to unemployment from a jail less those who find a job and are enjailed as criminals:
4ui = λF (ϕ˜) (1− ui − ni) + ρni − (θiq (θi) + pi)ui = 0,
leading to
ui = λF (ϕ˜)+(ρ−λF (ϕ˜))niλF (ϕ˜)+θiq(θi)+pi .
Then, steady-state workers with a wage lower than C is composed of a share of unemployed who
transit into employed and is diminished by those who lose job, transit into higher than crime wage
category (with the same probability as finding a new job θiq (θi)), and are caught as criminals.
Hence,
4ELji = θiq (θi)F
(
ϕCij
)
ui −
(
θiq (θi)
(
1− F
(
ϕCij
))
+ λF (ϕ˜) + pi
)
ELji = 0,
ELji =
θiq(θi)F(ϕCij)
θiq(θi)(1−F(ϕCij))+λF (ϕ˜)+pi
ui.
The steady-state workers with higher wage than C is composed of those who transit from unem-
ployed and ELji and lose jobs:
4EHji =
(
1− F
(
ϕCij
))
θiq (θi)
(
ELji + ui
)
− λF (ϕ˜)EHji = 0,
EHji =
(1−F(ϕCij))θiq(θi)
λF (ϕ˜)
(
ELji + ui
)
= (1−F(ϕ
C
ij))θiq(θi)
λF (ϕ˜)
(
θiq(θi)+λF (ϕ˜)+pi
θiq(θi)(1−F(ϕCij))+λF (ϕ˜)+pi
)
ui.
At last, the enjailed criminals are composed of unemployed and those earning less than a crime
wage caught and those released into unemployment:
4ni = pi
(
ELji + ui
)
− ρni = 0,
yielding
ni =
pi
ρ
(
ELji + ui
)
= pi
ρ
 θiq (θi) + λF (ϕ˜) + pi
θiq (θi)
(
1− F
(
ϕCij
))
+ λF (ϕ˜) + pi
ui.
Then, steady states of the partitioned population are given by
ui =
ρλF (ϕ˜i)(θiq(θi)(1−F(ϕCij))+λF (ϕ˜)+pi)
Ωi ,
ELji =
ρλF (ϕ˜i)θiq(θi)F(ϕCij)
Ωi ,
EHji =
ρ(1−F(ϕCij))θiq(θi)(θiq(θi)+λF (ϕ˜)+pi)
Ωi ,
ni
λF (ϕ˜i)pi(θiq(θi)+λF (ϕ˜)+pi)
Ωi ,
where Ωi = (λF (ϕ˜) + θiq (θi) + pi)
(
ρθiq (θi)
(
1− F
(
ϕCij
))
+ (ρ+ pi)λF (ϕ˜)
)
. The crime rate is
given by
ci =
ELji+ui
1−ni =
ρλF (ϕ˜i)
θiq(θi)(1−F(ϕCij))+λF (ϕ˜)
.
The sign of the derivative of the above equation with respect to cutoff productivity level is given by(
∂ELji
∂ϕ˜i
+ ∂ui∂ϕ˜i
)
(1− ni) + ∂ni∂ϕ˜i
(
ELji + ui
)
= E
H
ji
ϕ˜i
(
ELji + ui
) (
εELji+ui,ϕ˜i
− εEHji , ϕ˜i
)
,
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where εf denotes the elasticity of a particular function f . We used the property of the elasticity of
a sum of two functions. Hence, the sign is given by εELji+ui,ϕ− εEHji , ϕ which depends on the impact
of a threshold productivity on crime productivity, ∂ϕCi /∂ϕ˜i. The dependence between reservation
and crime wages is obvious from equation (3.9). It is clear that the crime rate increases as long
as a change in match-specific productivity affects criminals (unemployed ui and employed under
the lower than a crime wage ELji) relatively more than high-income earners EHji (those earning
wij (ϕ) ≥ Cij). Recall that we are working under the case of φUij = 1, therefore, an increase in
reservation productivity for a successful match increases an army of unemployed who will find it
optimal to engage in criminal activities (to counteract this effect one needs a very large decrease
in criminal wage, so that a distance between two cutoffs becomes small). Yet this is unlikely as in
general an increase in reservation productivity induces a rise in a crime wage (see equation (3.9)).
To be precise,
sign
(
∂ci
∂ϕ˜i
)
= sign
((
1− F
(
ϕCij
))
f (ϕ˜i) + f
(
ϕCij
)(
∂ϕCi
∂ϕ˜i
)
F (ϕ˜i)
)
.
The crime productivity increases given an increase in threshold productivity iff
(
∂ϕCi
∂ϕ˜i
)
> −(1−F(ϕ
C
ij))f(ϕ˜i)
f(ϕCij)F (ϕ˜i)
.
Alternatively, the crime rate decreases iff
(
∂ϕCi
∂ϕ˜i
)
< −(1−F(ϕ
C
ij))f(ϕ˜i)
f(ϕCij)F (ϕ˜i)
.40 To reassure, explore elas-
ticities εELji+ui,ϕ˜i and εEHji , ϕ˜i :
εELji+ui,ϕ˜i
= ϕ˜i
[
f(ϕ˜i)
F (ϕ˜i) −
Ω˜′i
Ω˜i
]
εEHji , ϕ˜i
= −ϕ˜i
[(
f(ϕCij)
(1−F(ϕCij))
(
∂ϕCi
∂ϕ˜i
))
+ Ω˜
′
i
Ω˜i
]
Therefore,
εELji+ui,ϕ˜i
− εEHji , ϕ˜i
= ϕ˜i
[
f(ϕ˜i)
F (ϕ˜i) −
Ω˜′i
Ω˜i
]
+ ϕ˜i
[(
f(ϕCij)
(1−F(ϕCij))
(
∂ϕCi
∂ϕ˜i
))
+ Ω˜
′
i
Ω˜i
]
= ϕ˜i
[
f(ϕ˜i)
F (ϕ˜i) +
f(ϕCij)
(1−F(ϕCij))
(
∂ϕCi
∂ϕ˜i
)]
.
Positive effect materializes iff ∂ϕ
C
i
∂ϕ˜i
> − f(ϕ˜i)F (ϕ˜i)
1−F(ϕCij)
f(ϕCij)
. Hence, the result is determined by the
hazard ratios (inverse Mill’s ratios if Normal distributions are assumed). More precisely, λ
(
ϕCij
)
≡
f
(
ϕCij
)
/
(
1− F
(
ϕCij
))
is the hazard function and r (ϕ˜i) ≡ f (ϕ˜i) /F (ϕ˜i) is the reverse hazard
function. Intuitively, hazard rate is the probability of observing a match within a neighborhood of
ϕCij , conditional on the productivity being no less than ϕCij . Finally, the reverse hazard rate is the
probability of observing an outcome in a neighborhood of ϕ˜i, conditional on the match productivity
being no more than a threshold ϕ˜i. Thus, we can express the condition as
∂ϕCi
∂ϕ˜i
> − r(ϕ˜i)
λ(ϕCij)
.
40One could also explore (3.9) and notice that the integral’s f lower limit is variable and endogenous where f =´ 1
ϕc
(1−F (z))dz
r+λ(1−F (z))+λF (ϕ˜) . This approach is quite complex for an arbitrary distribution function and is not reported
here. Expressions can be shared under request.
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We can also use the fact that
∂w(ϕCi )
∂ϕ˜i
/
∂w(ϕCi )
∂ϕCi
= ∂ϕ
C
i
∂ϕ˜i
=
[
λf(ϕ˜)
gj
pi
+λβ ∂fi
∂ϕ˜i
]
∂ϕ˜i
∂ϕC
i
β ,
which immediately leads to
∂ϕCi
∂ϕ˜i
=
√
λ
(
gjf(ϕ˜)
βpi +
∂fi
∂ϕ˜i
)
.
Therefore, the derivative is well defined only for the positive domain (ruling out complex solution).
This trivially leads to the statement about cutoff productivity and its effect on crime.
Turning to the proposition claims, we note that an increase in a frequency of match-specific shocks
increases crime rate follows from the fact that ρF (ϕ˜i)
(
1− F
(
ϕCi
))
θiq (θi) > 0. This result can
be interpreted as the one stating that an increase in volatility of economic environment tends to
increase crime rate.
Second, an increase in the crime wage (or productivity ϕCi ) also increases crime rate since
λF (ϕ˜i) θiq (θi) f
(
ϕCi
)
> 0 where f
(
ϕCi
)
≡ dF
(
ϕCi
)
/dϕCi and ∂ϕCi /∂ϕ˜i = 0. In other case,
refer to discussion above. Intuitively, an increase in a crime-wage increases a number of firms which
pay a wage smaller or equal to C and this how it increases a number of criminals.
Thirdly, an increase in job seekers in the other region increases crime rate given the elasticity of
the labor market tightness is smaller than minus one (larger than one in absolute value). Recall
that θi ≡ vi/Si = vi/ (uii + uji). Hence, the more the job seekers from the other region, the smaller
is the labor market tightness, ceteris paribus. Then, differentiating equation (3.12) with respect
to θi we obtain −λF (ϕ˜i) (q (θi) + θiq′ (θi)) . This term is positive if and only if q (θi) + θiq′ (θi) =
q (θi) (1 + θiq′ (θi) /q (θi)) < 0 which implies that the elasticity of instantaneous meeting probability
for vacancies is θiq′ (θi) /q (θi) < −1 or |θiq′ (θi) /q (θi)| > 1.
Fourth, an influx of more productive employees from i to j who raise the productivity of a match
in j leads to an increase in crime in j. Note that more productive job seekers, ceteris paribus, induce
an increase in the reservation wage (productivity). This leads to an increase in crime rate. To see
this, differentiate equation (3.12) with respect to cutoff productivity level. After manipulations, the
term that determines the sign is
[
f (ϕ˜i)
(
1− F
(
ϕCi
))
+ f
(
ϕCi
) (
∂ϕCi /∂ϕ˜i
)
F (ϕ˜i)
]
λθiq (θi) where
f (ϕ˜i) ≡ dF (ϕ˜i) /dϕ˜i, f
(
ϕCi
)
≡ dF
(
ϕCi
)
/dϕCi and the dependence between reservation and crime
wages is obvious from equation (3.9). Recall that we are working under the case of φUij = 1, therefore,
an increase in reservation productivity for a successful match increases an army of unemployed who
will find it optimal to engage in criminal activities (to counteract this effect one needs a very large
decrease in criminal wage, so that a distance between two cutoffs becomes small). Yet this is
not possible given we rule out complex solutions which then tells that an increase in reservation
productivity induces a rise in a crime wage (see equation (3.9)) and the discussion above.
Crime Categories - 2009 Report of the German Federal Criminal Police Office41
435*00 Theft by Burglary of a Dwelling
including:
436*00 Daytime burglaries of residences (committed between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m.)
41http://www.bka.de/nn_242508/DE/Publikationen/PolizeilicheKriminalstatistik/AeltereAusgaben/PksEnglisch/
pksEnglisch__node.html?__nnn=true
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*50*00 Theft in/ from Motor Vehicles
674000 Damage to Property
including:
674100 damage to motor vehicles
674300 other damage to property committed in streets, lanes or public places
674500 destruction of important equipment
730000 Drug Offenses - Narcotics Act
including:
731000 general violations
thereof:
731100 involving heroin
731200 involving cocaine
731300 involving LSD
731400 involving amphetamine/ methamphetamine and their derivatives in powder or liquid form
731500 involving amphetamine/ methamphetamine and their derivatives in tablet or capsule form
731800 involving cannabis and preparations thereof
731900 involving other drugs
732000 trafficking in, and smuggling of drugs
thereof:
732100 in/of heroin
732200 in/of cocaine
732300 in/of LSD
732400 in/of amphetamine/ methamphetamine and their derivatives in powder or liquid form
732500 in/of amphetamine/ methamphetamine and their derivatives in tablet or capsule form
732800 in/of cannabis and preparations thereof
732900 in/of other drugs
733000 illegal importation of drugs (significant amounts)
thereof:
733100 of heroin
733200 of cocaine
733300 of LSD
733400 of amphetamine/methamphetamine and their derivatives in powder or liquid form
733500 of amphetamine/ methamphetamine and their derivatives in tablet or capsule form
733800 of cannabis and preparations thereof
733900 of other drugs
734000 other violations of the NCA
899000 Street Crime includes the following offenses:
111100 offenses against sexual selfdetermination by sudden attack (individual offender)
111200 offenses against sexual selfdetermination by sudden attack (group of offenders)
132000 indecent exposure and indecent acts in public
213000 transports of cash and valuables
214000 assault on motorists with intent to rob
215000 robbery following restaurant/bar visit
41
216000 handbag robbery
217000 other robberies in streets, lanes or public places
222100 dangerous and serious bodily injury in streets, lanes or public places
233300 extortionate kidnapping in connection with robberies of transports of cash and valuables
234300 hostage taking in connection with robberies of transports of cash and valuables
*20*00 theft in/from kiosks
*30*00 in/from store windows, showcases and display cases
*50*00 theft in/from motor vehicles
*55000 theft of motor vehicles
*90*00 pickpocketing
*001001 theft of motor vehicles
*002001 theft of mopeds and motorcycles
*003001 theft of bicycles
*007001 theft of/from coin-operated machines
623000 breach of the public peace
674100 damage to motor vehicles
674300 other damage to property committed in streets, lanes or public places
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Table 6.1: First Stages for Table 5.1
Predicted growth in: UR UR 15-25 US 15-25 Male UR Female UR Foreign UR
(A) Employees under Age 20 0.155 0.144 0.131 0.149 0.153 0.140
(0.244) (0.242) (0.241) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244)
Spatial Lag 0.750*** 0.755*** 0.775*** 0.752*** 0.753*** 0.758***
(0.279) (0.277) (0.275) (0.279) (0.279) (0.280)
Employees Age 20 to 25 -1.243*** -1.259*** -1.269*** -1.252*** -1.244*** -1.267***
(0.344) (0.342) (0.340) (0.346) (0.343) (0.343)
Part-time Employees -1.889*** -1.878*** -1.779*** -1.882*** -1.867*** -1.828***
(0.587) (0.581) (0.589) (0.584) (0.592) (0.593)
Full-time Employees 0.180 0.201 0.211 0.187 0.206 0.246
(0.320) (0.318) (0.317) (0.324) (0.315) (0.374)
(B) Employees under Age 20 -0.026 0.008 0.051 -0.057 0.010 0.002
(0.245) (0.243) (0.244) (0.246) (0.244) (0.244)
Spatial Lag -0.113 -0.119 -0.161 -0.087 -0.141 -0.131
(0.301) (0.300) (0.300) (0.301) (0.300) (0.300)
Employees Age 20 to 25 0.369 0.426 0.466 0.333 0.412 0.362
(0.302) (0.299) (0.300) (0.304) (0.301) (0.305)
Part-time Employees -2.891*** -2.861*** -3.051*** -2.814*** -3.003*** -2.302***
(0.567) (0.579) (0.584) (0.564) (0.571) (0.579)
Full-time Employees -3.223*** -3.314*** -3.352*** -3.116*** -3.357*** -2.619***
(0.314) (0.311) (0.310) (0.321) (0.308) (0.375)
(C) Employees under Age 20 -0.004 -0.017 -0.007 -0.014 0.004 0.009
(0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
Spatial Lag 0.264** 0.280** 0.282** 0.271** 0.259** 0.257**
(0.128) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.127)
Employees Age 20 to 25 0.007 0.001 0.013 -0.004 0.018 0.025
(0.160) (0.158) (0.158) (0.159) (0.160) (0.160)
Part-time Employees -0.029 0.049 0.073 -0.008 -0.049 -0.055
(0.310) (0.308) (0.311) (0.308) (0.311) (0.323)
Full-time Employees 0.592** 0.593** 0.581** 0.620** 0.568** 0.562**
(0.245) (0.241) (0.239) (0.244) (0.245) (0.265)
(D) Employees under Age 20 -0.058 -0.045 -0.056 -0.061 -0.053 -0.041
(0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.188) (0.187) (0.187)
Spatial Lag 0.127 0.121 0.142 0.130 0.121 0.118
(0.210) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.210)
Employees Age 20 to 25 -0.011 0.008 0.001 -0.014 -0.006 0.012
(0.283) (0.282) (0.280) (0.284) (0.282) (0.283)
Part-time Employees -3.148*** -3.158*** -3.056*** -3.138*** -3.176*** -3.171***
(0.473) (0.472) (0.474) (0.471) (0.475) (0.465)
Full-time Employees -2.308*** -2.335*** -2.328*** -2.294*** -2.343*** -2.336***
(0.272) (0.270) (0.270) (0.277) (0.267) (0.311)
(E) Employees under Age 20 -0.036 -0.025 -0.009 -0.052 -0.017 -0.019
(0.093) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
Spatial Lag 0.435*** 0.437*** 0.427*** 0.448*** 0.422*** 0.425***
(0.106) (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Employees Age 20 to 25 -0.161 -0.137 -0.122 -0.180 -0.139 -0.154
(0.145) (0.145) (0.146) (0.145) (0.146) (0.147)
Part-time Employees -1.863*** -1.826*** -1.867*** -1.822*** -1.914*** -1.665***
(0.258) (0.261) (0.258) (0.255) (0.262) (0.260)
Full-time Employees -1.031*** -1.065*** -1.082*** -0.975*** -1.093*** -0.831***
(0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.163)
Note: UR denotes the unemployment rate and US the unemployment share. (A): Theft by burglary of a dwelling. (B):
Theft in/ from motor vehicles. (C): Damage to property. (D): Drug-related offenses. (E): Street Crime. Standard
errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. **, *** denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 6.2: First Stages for Table 5.2
Theft by Burglary of a Dwelling
Predicted growth in: CSL UR UR 15-25 US 15-25 Male UR Female UR Foreign UR
Employees under 0.142 -2.649*** -3.523*** -1.358*** -3.472*** -1.674* -3.914
Age 20 (0.244) (1.000) (1.135) (0.476) (1.037) (0.983) (2.379)
Spatial Lag 0.757*** 1.401** 3.098*** 2.204*** 2.154*** 0.480 1.634
(0.280) (0.560) (1.004) (0.556) (0.633) (0.521) (1.692)
Employees Age -1.261*** -3.525** -3.303* -0.981 -4.450*** -2.396 -9.235**
20 to 25 (0.340) (1.508) (1.742) (0.858) (1.587) (1.470) (4.055)
Part-time Employees -1.870*** 3.923* 13.408*** 10.821*** 6.201** -0.373 64.660***
(0.590) (2.239) (3.155) (1.943) (2.460) (2.239) (8.453)
Full-time Employees 0.203 4.676*** 3.212* 0.983 7.895*** -0.512 67.333***
(0.316) (1.140) (1.820) (1.199) (1.249) (1.131) (6.852)
Theft in/ from Motor Vehicles
Predicted growth in: CSL UR UR 15-25 US 15-25 Male UR Female UR Foreign UR
Employees under 0.044 -2.608*** -3.536*** -1.374*** -3.433*** -1.640* -3.906*
Age 20 (0.243) (0.994) (1.138) (0.480) (1.030) (0.976) (2.345)
Spatial Lag -0.151 1.406** 3.105*** 2.198*** 2.165*** 0.467 1.752
(0.299) (0.567) (1.005) (0.555) (0.639) (0.527) (1.703)
Employees Age 0.461 -3.424** -3.325* -1.026 -4.345*** -2.330 -9.074**
20 to 25 (0.298) (1.496) (1.738) (0.873) (1.574) (1.459) (4.098)
Part-time Employees -2.999*** 4.052* 13.323*** 10.791*** 6.294** -0.181 64.109***
(0.571) (2.229) (3.090) (1.894) (2.465) (2.201) (9.076)
Full-time Employees -3.347*** 4.673*** 3.190* 0.995 7.876*** -0.471 67.030***
(0.307) (1.136) (1.816) (1.199) (1.247) (1.122) (6.978)
Note: CSL denotes the crime spatial lag, UR the unemployment rate and US the unemployment share. Standard errors robust
to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table 6.3: First Stages for Table 5.3
Predicted Growth in Employees:
under Age 20 SL under Age 20 Age 20 to 25 Part-time Full-time
CSL 0.070 0.548** -1.151*** -1.992*** 0.164
(0.239) (0.269) (0.351) (0.678) (0.463)
UR -2.752** 1.711*** -3.601** 5.289** 4.098***
(1.125) (0.630) (1.651) (2.294) (1.568)
SLUR 0.260 -0.437 -0.090 5.337*** 5.210***
(0.300) (0.377) (0.678) (1.431) (0.994)
UR 15-25 -3.505*** 3.679*** -3.541* 15.613*** 2.738
(1.234) (1.064) (1.825) (3.343) (2.300)
SLUR 15-25 0.211 0.390 0.516 18.554*** 13.743***
(0.430) (0.546) (0.857) (1.905) (1.415)
US 15-25 -1.262** 2.396*** -0.986 11.856*** 1.336
(0.492) (0.590) (0.856) (2.137) (1.516)
SLUS 15-25 0.231 0.913*** 1.162** 13.215*** 8.878***
(0.263) (0.293) (0.467) (1.181) (0.863)
Male UR -3.661*** 2.453*** -4.631*** 7.815*** 7.471***
(1.159) (0.698) (1.735) (2.568) (1.694)
SL Male UR 0.374 -0.469 -0.316 4.331*** 4.717***
(0.311) (0.391) (0.678) (1.527) (1.064)
Female UR -1.657 0.760 -2.198 0.751 -1.226
(1.107) (0.587) (1.608) (2.268) (1.484)
SL Female UR -0.011 -0.194 -0.042 7.063*** 6.641***
(0.310) (0.385) (0.703) (1.444) (0.954)
Foreign UR -4.218 2.260 -10.940** 60.706*** 60.313***
(2.642) (1.866) (4.436) (7.603) (7.073)
SL Foreign UR -0.659 0.683 -1.678 11.264*** 13.211***
(1.254) (1.184) (2.600) (4.001) (3.456)
Note: CSL denotes the crime spatial lag, UR the unemployment rate, US the unemployment share and SL the spatial lag.
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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